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Destination Unknown: Illinois' Search for a Solution
to the Physician Collective Bargaining Problem
Charles S. Ofstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 28, 2001, Representative Angelo "Skip" Saviano of the
Illinois House introduced House Bill 3086, entitled the Health Care
Services Contract Joint Discussions Act ("H.B. 3086").1 Representative
Saviano sought to rectify a perceived imbalance between independent
physicians and health care plans. 2 The bill was designed as a legislative
response to the health care industry's abandonment of the traditional
"fee-for-service" 3 system of the early 1980s in favor of "managed care
organizations" ("MCOs"), 4 a less expensive alternative. 5 In short, H.B.
* J.D. expected May 2003. Thanks to Sandy DiVarco and the rest of the Loyola University
Chicago Law Journal staff for their guidance and editorial comments on previous drafts. To my
family, especially my wife Laurel, thank you for your love, encouragement, and continual support
throughout the writing of this article and beyond.
1. Health Care Services Contract Joint Discussions Act, H.B. 3086, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (I11. 2001); see infra Part HI.A (providing a more detailed discussion of H.B. 3086).
2. I11. H.B. 3086, § 5(b).
3. A "fee-for-service" system exists when the physician is free to set a reasonable fee, and if
the insurance company does not pay the full amount, the patient becomes responsible for the
remainder. Jeremy Lutsky, Is Your Physician Becoming a Teamster: The Rising Trend of
Physicians Joining Labor Unions in the Late 1990s, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 55, 57
(1997).
4. The term "Managed Care Organization" (MCO) describes "a variety of organizations [such
as HMOs, PPOs, etc.] that control costs and utilization of health care services." See Barbara A.
Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the Realities of Cost
Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1219 (1997). "In 1995, more than 120 million
Americans were enrolled in some type of managed health care plan." Ellen .L. Luepke, White
Coat, Blue Collar: Physician Unionization and Managed Care, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 275, 275-
76 (1999); see also Maura F. Forde, Note, Jones v. Chicago HMO: The Illinois Supreme Court
Gives the HMO Industry a Rude Awakening, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 511, 511 n.3 (2001)
("Approximately 2.5 million Illinois residents are HMO subscribers.") (citation omitted).
5. MCOs differ from a fee-for-service system in that they rely on capitation, which is "the new
managed care form of financing which relies on pre-paid, per capita annual payments to provide a
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3086 would allow independent physicians to counter the power of
MCOs through collective bargaining. 6
The health care industry has experienced tremendous changes during
the past decade as a result of abandoning the fee-for-service system;
thus, many independent physicians were left with a dwindling patient
base, decreasing compensation, and less responsibility for the care of
their patients. 7 In addition, while the MCOs used their ever-increasing
patient base to exact demands, the federal antitrust laws restrained
independent physicians from using any countervailing leverage8 during
contract negotiations.9 Independent physicians, therefore, turned to
state legislatures in the hopes of gaining the power to collectively
bargain. 10
This Comment will examine joint negotiation legislation at the
federal and state levels, which would allow physicians to counter the
specific set of services for a group of 'covered lives."' James E. Eggleston, Patient Advocacy and
Consumer Protection Through Union Activism: Protecting Health Care Consumers, Patients and
Workers During an Unprecedented Restructuring of the Health Care Industry, 41 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 925, 926 (1997). In short "the managed care model inserts insurers as an intermediary into
medical decision making and the practice of medicine." Luepke, supra note 4, at 276.
6. I11. H.B. 3086, § 5(d) ("Empowering competing health care providers to hold joint
discussions with health care plans ... will help restore the competitive balance ... in the markets
for health care services."). The term "collective bargaining" means "negotiations between an
employer and the representatives of organized employees to determine the conditions of
employment." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 257 (7th ed. 1999).
7. See William S. Brewbaker III, Physician Unions and the Future of Competition in the
Health Care Sector, 33 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 545, 548 (2000) (noting that the "system now seems
to reward corporate bureaucrats, who specialize in cutting physician fees, burying doctors in
mountains of paperwork before they can be paid, and keeping patients away from providers"); see
infra Part I.A (discussing the transition from a fee-for-service to a MCO system).
8. The term "countervailing leverage" means to "compensate for" or "to exert force against an
opposing.., force or influence." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 258 (150th
Anniversary Ed. 1981).
9. The principal federal antitrust laws applicable to the health care industry are the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2000). Kenneth
Laurence, Antitrust Laws, Health Care Providers, and Managed Care, C653 ALI-ABA 279, 291
(1991); see infra Part II.B.1 (providing a more detailed discussion of the federal antitrust acts,
specifically the Sherman Act); see also Luepke, supra note 4, at 275-76 (noting as an example of
the increasing patient base of MCOs that more than 120 million were enrolled in MCOs as of
1995).
10. See Brewbaker, supra note 7, at 558. Physicians could, of course, enter into an
employment agreement with the MCOs. See Brewbaker, supra note 7, at 549 ("The proportion of
physicians who are employees ... has increased dramatically from 24.2% in 1983 to 42.3% in
1994."). Entering into such an employer-employee relationship with the MCO would allow
physicians to unionize. See Lutsky, supra note 3, at 67. Still, the majority of physicians are self-
employed. See Brewbaker, supra note 7, at 549.
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tremendous leverage that MCOs currently wield in the industry." In
Part II, this Comment will examine the situation that independent
physicians faced as the health care industry transitioned from a fee-for-
service system to MCOs.' 2  Next, it will discuss how the federal
antitrust acts constrain the ability of physicians to compete with
MCOs, 13 as well as Congress' failed efforts to provide relief to doctors
who wish to collectively bargain.' 4 This Comment will also offer
alternatives to federal legislation as a means of providing relief to
physicians. 15  This Comment will then examine the state action
doctrine, which allows state legislatures to implement laws permitting
physicians to collectively bargain. 16  It will also examine additional
efforts at the state level to give doctors this right without violating
federal antitrust laws. 17  Part III will provide an analysis of Illinois'
proposed legislation, H.B. 3086, in greater detail, focusing on whether it
complies with the requirements of the state action doctrine.18 It will
also explore another piece of legislation, Illinois House Bill 2115 ("H.B.
2115"), and examine how this legislation attempts to change the way
independent physicians contract with MCOs. 19 Next, Part IV will
discuss possible modifications that must be made to H.B. 3086 in order
for it to comply with the state action doctrine. 20  Part IV will also
examine the far-reaching impact that this legislation will have on
government at both the state and federal levels. 21 Finally, Part V will
propose alternative solutions that would allow physicians and other
11. See infra Part II (discussing federal and state legislation as precursors to Illinois'
legislation).
12. See infra Part II.A (examining the transition from a fee-for-service system to managed
care organizations as the dominant type of health care plan).
13. See infra Part II.B.l (discussing the federal antitrust acts).
14. See infra Part II.B.2 (exploring attempts at the federal level to modify the federal antitrust
acts to give countervailing power to physicians).
15. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the FTC/DOJ statements and their guidelines for antitrust
enforcement policy in health care).
16. See infra Part H.C. I (discussing the state action doctrine).
17. See infra Part II.C.2-3 (detailing the Joint Negotiations by Physicians with Health Benefit
Plans Act in Texas and other state legislation).
18. See infra Part II.A (analyzing Illinois' Health Care Services Contract Joint Discussion
Act).
19. See infra Part If.B (detailing Illinois' Fairness in Health Care Services Contracting Law).
20. See infra Part IV.A (discussing how H.B. 3086 may not comply with the state action
doctrine).
21. See infra Part IV.B (examining the policy implications of H.B. 3086).
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health care professionals to engage in cooperative discussions with
MCOs, to the benefit of all interested parties.
22
II. BACKGROUND
Under the fee-for-service system,23 physicians enjoyed strong
bargaining power and did not need an antitrust exemption to compete
with the health care insurance industry. 24 As physicians witnessed the
tremendous change in the industry from the fee-for-service system to
MCOs, however, physicians recognized a threat to their bargaining
power and advocated for a collective bargaining exemption from the
antitrust laws to level the playing field.25 Initial attempts were made at
the federal level to provide a direct exemption to the federal antitrust
laws for physicians. 26 When these attempts failed, physicians exercised
their influence at the state level to create an exemption through the
judicially created state action doctrine.2 7  These efforts were quite
successful in Texas and met with limited success in other states.28  Such
successes emboldened state congressional representatives to introduce
similar legislation in Illinois.
29
A. The Transition from Fee-for-Service to Managed Care
Organizations
Until the late 1980s, physicians were largely self-employed or
worked in small groups. 30  Doctors worked individually with their
patients to arrive at what they believed to be the best plan of care. 31
Health insurance companies rarely acted as interested third parties under
this fee-for-service system thereby alleviating the need for physicians to
22. See infra Part V (identifying alternative solutions to rectify the problems plaguing
physicians in the health care industry).
23. Lutsky, supra note 3, at 57; see also supra note 3 (defining a "fee-for-service" system).
24. See infra Part II.A (detailing the situation that independent physicians faced under the fee-
for-service system as compared to a managed care system).
25. See Guy 0. Farmer II & John H. Douglas, "Physician Unionization "-A Primer and
Prescription, 75 FLA. B.J. 37, 39-40 (2001); infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the federal antitrust acts
and the labor union exemption under the NLRA).
26. See infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing the failed attempts at the federal level to give physicians
an antirust exemption).
27. See infra Part II.C. 1 (detailing the state action doctrine).
28. See infra Part II.C.2-3 (discussing the Texas legislation and other state legislation).
29. See infra Part M (discussing Illinois H.B. 3086 and H.B. 2115).
30. Noah, supra note 5, at 1219 (noting that the market was comprised mainly of self-
employed physicians in solo or small group practices).
31. Luepke, supra note 4, at 278.
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negotiate with patients, the buyers of their services. 32  Indeed,
physicians were fairly and adequately compensated for whatever
services they recommended, regardless of their cost.33 The physicians
enjoyed significant bargaining power and the largest professional
association of physicians, the American Medical Association, strongly
opposed any attempts at unionization.
34
However, by the early 1990s, sophisticated corporate employers
recognized that their employees' health care costs could be lowered and
turned to MCOs as the preferred choice of health plan. 35  Intent on
maximizing profits, these corporations enrolled their employees in
MCO plans and abandoned the more expensive fee-for-service
system. 36 Reluctantly, physicians found themselves becoming "cogs in
the corporate health care machinery" with less control over patient care
decisions. 37
Additionally, the emergence of MCOs exerted tremendous downward
pressure on physician incomes 38 and limited physician autonomy and
32. See id. at 275. "In the days of fee-for-service, the physicians and patients controlled
health care decisions and insurers, for the most part, simply acted as payers." Id.
33. Id. at 278-79 (noting that "physicians recommended treatment, patients accepted it, and
indemnity insurance plans paid the bills"); Lutsky, supra note 3, at 57.
34. See Luepke, supra note 4, at 294. In 1984, the AMA Board stated that unions traditionally
are ill suited to a physician's "professional values of individualism and autonomy." Id.
35. Id. at 275-76. Essentially, MCOs injected themselves as middlemen between medical
decision-making and the practice of medicine. Id. at 276. MCOs describe "a variety of
organizations [such as HMOs and PPOs] that control costs and utilization of health care
services." Noah, supra note 5, at 1219.
36. See Forde, supra note 4, at 511 (noting that America's health care market transformed
from the traditional fee-for-service method of payment to a less expensive alternative).
37. Lutsky, supra note 3, at 55. MCOs, for example, implemented highly regimented
processes for determining the appropriate costs and courses of medical services and influenced
physician behavior by implementing new administrative and management strategies. Thomas H.
Segars, Comment, Bad Medicine: The Anticompetitive Side Effects of Physician Unionization, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1303, 1305 (2000). These strategies included shortening patient stays in
hospitals and regulating medical procedures. Jeffrey Rugg, An Old Solution To a New Problem:
Physician Unions Take the Edge off Managed Care, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 7 (2000).
MCOs even hired non-physician accountants to carry out the utilization management and review
procedures of their contracting physicians. Luepke, supra note 4, at 277. MCOs further
instituted strict control measures on physicians in an attempt to increase efficiency. Rugg, supra,
at 7. These procedures only briefly stabilized health care costs, however, and premiums have
continued to rise. See id. at 11.
38. Farmer & Douglas, supra note 25, at 37 (noting that managed care is responsible for
reducing physician incomes forty-four percent from where they would have been under a fee-for-
service system); Micah Berman, Note, The "Quality Health Care Coalition Act": Can Antitrust
Law Improve Patient Care?, 53 STAN. L. REV. 695, 699 (2000) (commenting that, while the
evidence is ambiguous, the advent of managed care dropped physician salaries almost four
percent in 1994).
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style of practice.3 9 Many physicians restructured their patient-centered
medical practices into bottom line-focused businesses in order to meet
the stringent demands of MCOs. 40  In some instances, physicians
attempted to circumvent MCO requirements in order to provide patients
with what they viewed as a necessary treatment. 41  Either way,
physicians had to concentrate less on patient care and more on the
financial bottom line, which in turn had an impact on the overall level
and quality of patient care in the health care industry. 42
The significant bargaining power traditionally enjoyed by physicians
was also affected by these changes in the health care industry.
43
Statistics indicate that a majority of Americans with private health
insurance became enrolled in managed care plans in 1993 and 1994.
44
As the number of participants in these plans grew, MCO leverage
increased to the point that individual physicians faced a "take-it-or-
leave-it" choice. 4 On the one hand, a physician could choose not to
39. See Segars, supra note 37, at 1306. MCOs influence physician behavior by implementing
financial incentives, administrative or management strategies, and information or normative
influences. Id.
40. Rugg, supra note 37, at 7. Indeed, many physicians have sold their practices to health
networks or have had to merge with hospitals. Id. These strict control measures include
shortening patient stays in hospitals and regulating medical procedures. Id.
41. See generally id. at 9 (noting that over twenty-eight percent of the physicians surveyed
agreed with the statement that, "today it is necessary to game the system to provide high quality
care").
42. Eggleston, supra note 5, at 926 (noting that "the essential economic mandate of the new
order of the health care industry is now in direct conflict with the health policy goal of quality
care and universal access").
43. See Segars, supra note 37, at 1308. Many physicians "attribute [the] deterioration in the
quality of health care and [the] economic slump ... to an unequal bargaining power enjoyed by
many consolidated MCOs." Id.
44. Steven J. Balla, Markets, Governments, and HMO Development in the 1990s, 24 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 215, 215 (1999) ("[T]he number of Americans enrolled in health
maintenance organizations .... grew from 35 million to 63 million between 1990 and 1996.");
Robin E. Remis, Health Care and the Federal Antitrust Laws, The Likelihood of a Harmonious
Coexistence, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 113, 113 n.6 (1996); see Noah, supra note 5,
at 1219-20 ("The rate of patient enrollment in MCOs continues to increase rapidly, with
approximately sixty million Americans currently enrolled in health maintenance organizations
and another ninety million in other types of managed care plans.").
45. Warren S. Grimes, The Sherman Act's Unintended Bias Against Lilliputians: Small
Players' Collective Action as a Counter to Relational Market Power, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 195,
215, 216 (2001); William G. Kopit, White Coats and Blue Collars: Physician Collective
Bargaining Legislation on the National and State Levels, SF28 ALI-ABA 93, 102 (2000)
("[T]here can be little question that individual physicians.., feel powerless to negotiate with
large [MCOs]."). Indeed, this "take-it-or-leave-it" choice was more than just black and white. As
MCOs grew more powerful, their physician contracts became more and more one-sided in favor
of the health plan, sometimes including "lowest cost" language, and clauses that would allow the
MCO to change the terms of their fee schedules at will. See Berman, supra note 38, at 702.
2002] Destination Unknown
deal with the MCOs, working only with patients paying for their own
care or with alternative health care plans.46  However, this approach
required the physician to turn away both established and new patients
simply because they were insured by an MCO. 47 By turning away these
patients, a physician risked reducing his or her patient base and
revenues to the point that practice would no longer be profitable.48
Conversely, a physician could retain at least a portion of his or her
patient base by contracting with an MCO. 4 9 Physicians contracting with
an MCO, however, risked losing established patients not covered by
that MCO. 50 Indeed, the only way for a physician to maintain his or her
entire patient base was to enter into an agreement with every MCO that
represented one of his or her patients.51
Under either of the scenarios described above, physicians were forced
to accept the MCO's fee schedule or risk losing a substantial portion of
their patient base.52  For most physicians, the choice was all too clear:
either lose their practice or contract with MCOs against their will. 53
B. Attempts at Federal Regulation
Under federal antitrust law, a physician facing a "take-it-or-leave-it"
contract from an MCO is limited to independent negotiations. 54  As a
result, physicians confronted with this dilemma began to lobby at the
46. Rugg, supra note 37, at 7. Cash payers were usually not covered by any sort of health
care plan and therefore paid for their own care. See id. Likewise, physicians could "pick and
choose patients based on the level of reimbursement provided by their health plan." Grimes,
supra note 45, at 215.
47. Rugg, supra note 37, at 8 n.40 (discussing how physicians who accept old-fashioned
health insurance or cash have to tailor their practices to fewer patients) (citation omitted).
48. Grimes, supra note 45, at 215.
49. See Luepke, supra note 4, at 275 (noting that, by 1995, 85% of American physicians had a
contract with at least one MCO); Noah, supra note 5, at 1219 (stating that three quarters of the
physicians in the country practice or contract with an MCO).
50. See Grimes, supra note 45, at 215. For some doctors, turning away these patients could
again reduce revenues to the point that their practice would no longer be profitable. See id.
51. Thus, it has been said that "many American physicians have sacrificed their autonomy to
survive financially." Kopit, supra note 45, at 102-03 (citation omitted). Indeed, physicians
sometimes only had to contract with the dominant MCO and wait for a merger to occur. See
Brewbaker, supra note 7, at 547. Mergers of MCOs occurred many times during the 1990s. Id.
For further discussion of whether or not this was done in an anticompetitive fashion, see infra
Part V.A (calling for an investigation into the mergers of MCOs in an effort to ensure physicians
are adequately compensated and that the quality of patient care is maximized).
52. See Kopit, supra note 45, at 102 (noting that two out of three privately insured Americans
are enrolled in some form of managed care plan).
53. Id. at 101-02. "Though physicians complain[ed] bitterly about the economic power of
[MCOs], many contract with those organizations because they control the patients." Id.
54. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the federal antitrust acts).
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federal level for an antitrust exemption, which would allow them to
collectively bargain with the dominant MCOs. 55  The Quality Health-
Care Coalition Act of 2000, which would allow physicians to
collectively bargain, met with opposition and did not move out of
committee in the United States Senate. 56  Consequently, physicians
looked to the states for relief.57
1. The Federal Antitrust Acts
a. The Sherman Act
Federal antitrust policy is predicated on the assumption that
competition produces the most efficient allocation of economic
resources. 58  To encourage competition, 15 U.S.C. § 1, commonly
known as the Sherman Act, 59 blocks certain combinations formed with
the purpose or effect of restraining trade.60 Although all contracts or
combinations restrain trade to some degree, courts have interpreted
section 1 of the Sherman Act as prohibiting only those agreements that
unreasonably restrain trade. 61 Therefore, most allegations regarding a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act are analyzed under the "rule
of reason" test,62 which compares an agreement's procompetitive and
55. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000); see also
Brewbaker, supra note 7, at 558-64 (making the proposition that new legislation might grant
independent physicians collective bargaining rights).
56. See infra Part I.B.3 (exploring the FTC/DOJ Antitrust Guidelines and their opposition to
the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000).
57. See infra Part lI.C (examining state legislation through the state action doctrine).
58. Segars, supra note 37, at 1309-10.
59. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). An analogous statute that supplies a private right of
action is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 15, and is commonly known as the Clayton Act. See generally
Mark L. Glassman, Can HMOs Wield Market Power? Assessing Antitrust Liability in the
Imperfect Market for Health Care Financing, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 91, 102-03 (1996) (providing
further information on the Sherman and Clayton Acts). Similarly, both the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act have analogous counterparts at the state level. Most state antitrust laws parallel
federal law, however, and are typically applied in accordance with federal antitrust principles.
See also Laurence, supra note 9, at 289. State antitrust laws and the Clayton Act are beyond the
scope of this Comment and will not be discussed.
60. Remis, supra note 44, at 117. As provided in the Act, "[e]very contract, combination ...
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1.
61. Glassman, supra note 59, at 105.
62. The definition of the "rule of reason" was articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis in 1918:
"The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."
Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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anticompetitive features. 63  The Supreme Court has found particular
types of agreements to be per se illegal. 64 In this type of situation, no
procompetitive justifications can be offered to show that the agreement
is reasonable.6
5
Likewise, section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits anyone from
monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, or conspiring to monopolize
the sale of their products. 66 Economists use the term "monopsony ' '67 to
describe a comparable prohibition on the buyer side of the equation.
68
Courts apply a two-part test to determine whether a defendant has
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.69 First, a defendant must have
"market power" in the relevant product market. 70  Second, a defendant
63. Analysis under the "rule of reason" test considers market conditions, procompetitive
justifications, effects of the agreement, and other relevant facts. Berman, supra note 38, at 703.
64. Some restraints are considered per se unlawful "'because of their pernicious effect on
competition and lack of any redeeming virtue [and thus] are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable."' Remis, supra note 44, at 118 (quoting No. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (alternation in original). Per se treatment is appropriate only when experience
"with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of
reason will condemn it .... Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344
(1982). Today, the only behaviors that qualify for per se status are: agreements among
competitors relating to prices, the division or allocation of product or geographic markets
between competitors, coercive or exclusionary group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal with
competitors; and certain kinds of tying arrangements involving coercive use of market power.
Laurence, supra note 9, at 302. Horizontal price fixing, which is the most relevant version of
price-fixing in the health care industry, is defined as cooperation between competitors to
eliminate or reduce competition based on price. Berman, supra note 38, at 704. Indeed,
physicians who have unionized in the past have been the subjects of successful litigation. See
Segars, supra note 37, at 1312 n.68; see generally Berman, supra note 38, at 706 (noting that
horizontal combinations are not barred by antitrust laws as long as mergers do not result in
unacceptably large concentrations of market power).
65. Berman, supra note 38, at 703. The Supreme Court has been unwilling to expand these
per se categories and is open to applying a rule of reason whenever a persuasive argument can be
made for it. Id.; see, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101
(1984) (noting that college football is "an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition
are essential if the product is to be available at all"); Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 23
(1979) (noting that not all arrangements among actual or potential competitors are per se
violations of the Sherman Act).
66. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States ... shall be ... guilty of a felony.").
67. Monopsony power refers to "a buyer's ability or power to depress the price of a good or
service below competitive levels." Segars, supra note 37, at 1322.
68. See Antitrust Coalition for Consumer Choice in Health Care: Hearing on H.R. 1304
Before House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Bill Jones),
available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/jones0622.htm.
69. Glassman, supra note 59, at 103.
70. Courts have traditionally used market share as proxy for market power in their evaluation.
Id. at 103-04. Market share is defined as "the percentage of the market for a product that a firm
supplies." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (7th ed. 1999). Most courts presume that groups
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must have engaged in, or attempted to engage in, anticompetitive
conduct.71  This element is satisfied when a defendant acquires, or
attempts to acquire, monopoly power through unlawful means or wields
such power to prevent or impede competition.72
A violation of the Sherman Act is a felony. 73  The Department of
Justice is charged with the public enforcement of the Sherman Act, and
the Federal Trade Commission is also authorized to bring legal action in
response to a violation of the Act. 74  The felony provision of the
Sherman Act places a strong proscription on cartel-like conduct and
monopolization. 75  Thus, the Sherman Act, in the absence of a
legislative exemption, stands in the path of collective action by
physicians.
76
b. The National Labor Relations Act
Congress granted employees a legislative exemption in the Clayton
Act to form labor unions free from antitrust scrutiny under section 1 of
the Sherman Act.77  The National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") 78
further defines this exemption and regulates unions that engage in
collective bargaining to enhance employment conditions.
79
with less than fifty percent of the market cannot unilaterally raise prices above competitive levels.
Brewbaker, supra note 7, at 566.
71. Glassman, supra note 59, at 104. This requirement guards against power that arises as a
result of having a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident. United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
72. Glassman, supra note 59, at 104.
73. Individuals who violate section 1 are subject to a fine of up to $350,000 and maximum
imprisonment of three years. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Individuals who violate
section 2 are subject to a fine not to exceed $10,000,000 if a corporation, $350,000 if a person,
and maximum imprisonment of three years. Id. § 2.
74. Glassman, supra note 59, at 102-03.
75. See Berman, supra note 38, at 706. Current antitrust law prohibits collective action by
physicians that is designed to raise the level of payment or to force MCOs to accept certain
contract terms. Id.
76. See Rugg, supra note 37, at 30-34.
77. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2000). The Clayton Act "operates by exempting human
labor from the definition of a 'commodity or article of commerce,' [thereby] removing it from
regulation under the Sherman Act and allowing labor organizations to conduct the 'legitimate
objects' of their organization." Luepke, supra note 4, at 282. A "union" has been defined as: "A
combination so formed, especially an alliance or confederation of people, parties, or political
entities for mutual interest or benefit." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000).
78. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
79. Id. § 152(5) (defining labor organizations). "Labor exemptions have been restricted to
unions acting in their own interest [and] unions using the least restrictive means available .... "
Segars, supra note 37, at 1310-11.
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Physicians, however, are not considered "employees" under the
NLRA.8 ° In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,8' the Supreme Court
limited the scope of the NLRA by holding that Congress did not intend
any "sweeping exclusion" for learned professions. 82  Because
physicians are learned professionals, this ruling means that they are not
included within the antitrust exception for employees. 83  In addition,
under the NLRA, physicians are considered independent contractors
instead of employees. 84 Moreover, the Court ruled, in a series of cases,
that the health care industry is not entitled to any special antitrust
immunity.85  Thus, the full weight of the federal antitrust laws was
thrust upon physicians, making it per se illegal for them to jointly raise,
lower, or otherwise fix prices. 86 As a result, the right to act collectively
in response to the growth of MCOs had to be achieved through
legislation. 87
2. The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000
The 105th Congress proposed the first legislative attempt to give
physicians the countervailing power to negotiate with MCOs in 1998.88
80. Berman, supra note 38, at 708. Physicians have historically been excluded from the
NLRA. Id.
81. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
82. Id. at 787.
83. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). These statutes exempted employees from antitrust prohibitions
and allowed them to engage in collective bargaining to enhance their employment conditions.
Kopit, supra note 45, at 97-98.
84. Berman, supra note 38, at 708. The NLRA states that "the term employee shall include
any employee ... but shall not include ... any individual having the status of an independent
contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor .. " 29 U.S.C. § 152(3). Even the AMA
did not contest this definition. See Luepke, supra note 4, at 291 ("The AMA, in a 1997 Board of
Trustees Report, concluded that independent physicians are not eligible for the employment
exception under the [antitrust acts] and may not collectively bargain with MCOs or other health
plans.").
85. The Court indicated in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustee of Rex Hospital that the Sherman
Act was applicable to the health care profession. Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Tr. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.
738 (1976). Subsequently, the Court made it clear that the health care industry was not subject to
any special immunity or relaxed antitrust standard. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 348-49 (1982); see generally, Berman, supra note 38, at 704-05 (tracing the Court's
line of cases from Goldfarb to Maricopa).
86. Berman, supra note 38, at 705 (noting that any agreement between competing doctors to
raise, lower, or otherwise fix prices is per se illegal); see Segars, supra note 37, at 1311-12
("[W]ithout an applicable exemption, the anticompetitive effects of a physician union may be
scrutinized under specific antitrust laws.").
87. Grimes, supra note 45, at 196 ("[T]here is no general collective action defense in antitrust
law, even for small players confronting a dominant upstream or downstream player that dictates
the terts of sale for goods or services.").
88. Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1998, H.R. 4277, 105th Cong.
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After the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1998 failed to move out
of committee,8 9  Representative Tom Campbell of California
reintroduced the idea in the 106th Congress.90 This time, however, the
legislation garnered the support of the American Medical Association. 9 1
The new version of the bill, entitled the Quality Health-Care Coalition
Act of 2000 ("QHCCA"), would create an exemption to the federal
antitrust laws specifically for health care professionals. 92  This
exemption would permit collective bargaining by health care
professionals similar to employees under the NLRA.93 Proponents of
the QHCCA argued that the bill would positively affect the quality of
health care by increasing the leverage and bargaining position of
doctors who could then force MCOs to improve the level of patient
care.94 The legislation would help to ensure that all MCO contracts
signed by health care professionals are fair and equitable. 95
89. A committee or subcommittee has the option to "table" a bill, or postpone action on it
indefinitely. See generally How Our Laws Are Made, VI: Consideration By Committee,
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/lawsmade.bysec/considbycomm.html (last modified July
23, 2000) [hereinafter How Our Laws Are Made] (describing the structure of the committee
process). The practical effect of this system is that bills fail to move out of the committee or
subcommittee until the end of the legislative session, which is two years long. Id. In the case of
the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1998, it failed to move out of committee before the end
of the 105th Congress and expired at the end of that Congress in 1998. Kopit, supra note 45, at
104-05.
90. Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000, H.R. 1304, 106th Cong.
91. See generally Statement of the American Medical Association in Support of the Quality
Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 106th Congress (1999) (statement of E. Ratcliffe Anderson, Jr., M.D., EVP, and CEO
of the AMA), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/article/4111-4137.html [hereinafter
Statement of the AMA] (indicating the AMA's approval of H.R. 1304).
92. H.R. 1304, § (2)(a). The substantive portion of the bill, in its entirety, read:
Any health care professionals.., engaged in negotiations with a health plan regarding
the terms of any contract ... [for] health care items or services for which benefits are
provided ... shall, in connection with such negotiations, be entitled to the same
treatment under the antitrust laws as the treatment to which bargaining units which are
recognized under the National Labor Relations Act are entitled in connection with such
collective bargaining.
Id.
93. Id.
94. Brewbaker, supra note 7, at 550-51 (stating the argument "that unionization will benefit
consumers by strengthening the hand of doctors in protecting consumer interests against HMO
interference").
95. See Statement of the AMA, supra note 91. Indeed, the terms and conditions of a health
plan can be unreasonable enough to cause harm to patients. Id.; see supra note 45 and
accompanying text (explaining how contracts with the MCOs were generally one-sided in favor
of the health plan).
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Opponents of the QHCCA quickly pointed out that the bill increased
physician incomes above competitive levels.96 Additionally, opponents
expressed doubts about whether the quality of patient care would be
improved under such a system.97 They pointed out that in the era before
managed care, local groups of physicians were the first to suppress
private cost-containment efforts and resist price competition. 98  Any
mechanism that gave physicians back this power, QHCCA opponents
argued, would undoubtedly reintroduce these tactics into the health care
industry.
99
The FTC and DOJ were particularly vocal in their criticism of the
QHCCA. 1°° Both Robert Pitofsky, Chairman of the FTC, and Joel I.
Klein, Assistant Attorney General, DOJ Antitrust Division, testified
before a House committee, regarding QHCCA, to reiterate their
agencies' opposition to the bill. 101 According to these agencies, the
QHCCA would result in higher prices for consumers without any
guarantee of improved patient care.10 2 The FTC and DOJ provided data
indicating that health plan markets vary widely and that MCOs typically
face considerable competition from other MCOs. 103 Thus, most MCOs
do not have sufficient monopsony power in most areas to warrant a
96. See generally Kopit, supra note 45, at 110-12 (discussing potential increase of income for
physicians and cost of health care system). The Congressional Budget Office's estimates on the
bill stated that it would increase physician incomes by 4.5%. Id. at 11. In response to this
figure, the Health Insurance Association of America also commissioned a study which claimed
that the national medical costs could rise as much as $80 billion a year. Id. at 112.
97. See Brewbaker, supra note 7, at 551. Opponents viewed the argument that patients would
benefit from the unionization of doctors as "highly suspect" because "unions generally achieve
their goals at the expense of employers and consumers." Id. (emphasis added).
98. Id. (noting that "local medical societies routinely suppressed private cost-containment
efforts, resisted price competition, prevented the formation of MCOs, and boycotted other
professionals that threatened the competitive interests of the profession").
99. Id.
100. Kopit, supra note 45, at 113-14. The FTC and DOJ are the two federal agencies most
responsible for law enforcement. Murray S. Monroe & William J. Seitz, Health Care Under the
Antitrust Guidelines, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 71, 72 (1995). The DOJ is charged with the public
enforcement of the Sherman Act, while the FTC is authorized to bring actions for violations of
the Sherman Act by virtue of its authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act. Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000); see supra note 74 and accompanying text
(discussing the enforcement authority of the Sherman Act).
101. H.R. REP. No. 106-625, at 30 (2000) (statement of Chairman Pitofsky); id. at 42
(statement of Assistant Attorney General Klein).
102. Id. at 31-32 (statement of Chairman Pitofsky).
103. Id. at 45-46 (statement of Assistant Attorney General Klein). Furthermore, managed care
markets are constantly changing, and more than 150 new MCOs were licensed to operate in the
United States between 1994 and 1997. Id. (statement of Assistant Attorney General Klein).
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need for physicians to collectively bargain.'04 Essentially, the FTC and
DOJ were concerned that the QHCCA's goal to equalize bargaining
power rested on theoretical assumptions that did not accurately describe
the majority of health care markets. 10 5 Therefore, the QHCCA did not
provide assurance that its enactment would decrease health care
costs. 106
Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde of Illinois also expressed
concern regarding the potential costs of the QHCCA legislation. 0 7
Accordingly, he persuaded the House Judiciary Committee to limit the
duration of the QHCCA by amending the bill with a sunset provision. 10 8
The Hyde Amendment also called for a government study, to be
conducted by the FTC during the final six months of the sunset
provision, to evaluate whether or not the legislation should be
reauthorized. 109
After the bill was amended, the Judiciary Committee reported the bill
favorably to the House floor.110 The House of Representatives
subsequently passed the QHCCA. i l' Despite this success in the House,
the bill never reached the floor of the Senate." l2  Instead, Senate
Majority Leader Trent Lott of Mississippi chose to stall the bill in
committee 113 over concerns that it would interfere with the successful
104. Kopit, supra note 45, at 103 ("In fact, in testimony before the House Judiciary
Committee, a representative of the Chamber of Commerce and the Antitrust Coalition for
Consumer Choice in Health Care, testified that in large metropolitan statistical areas ... there
may be more than eight managed care companies operating.").
105. H.R. REP. No. 106-625, at 39 (statement of Chairman Pitofsky). Data on HMOs for
example, show that HMOs face competitions from other HMOs as well as other types of health
plans. Id. at 38 (statement of Chairman Pitofsky).
106. Id. at 39 (statement of Chairman Pitofsky).
107. Kopit, supra note 45, at 106-07. Indeed, Chairman Hyde was unwilling "to support the
bill until the Congressional Budget Committee estimates of its costs were known." Id.
108. This sunset provision causes the legislation to expire, without an affirmative act by
Congress, after three years. See id. This was done because of Chairman Hyde's disagreement
and uncertainty as to how the bill would work under actual market conditions. Id. at 107.
109. Id. The Hyde Amendment established the FTC as the responsible agency to conduct the
study. Id. However, an additional amendment shifted responsibility for the study to the General
Accounting Office. Id.
110. Id. at 106. The Judiciary Committee voted favorably 26-2 to send the bill to the House
floor. Id.
11. Id. at 108. The United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 1304, the Quality
Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000, on June 30, 2000, by a vote of 276-136. Id.
112. Berman, supra note 38, at 697 ("Due to opposition from Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott and other Senate Republican leaders, the [QHCCA] remained bottled up in a Senate
committee for the remainder of the 106th Congress.").
113. See supra note 89 (explaining how postponing action on a bill can keep it from getting
out of a legislative session); see generally How Our Laws Are Made, supra note 89 (describing
the structure of the committee process).
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passage of another important health care policy priority, the Patients'
Bill of Rights. 114 The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act has not been
reintroduced during the 107th Congress and, in the face of continued
health care policy debates, its fate at the federal level is unclear. 115
3. The FTC/DOJ Statements and Their Guidelines for Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care
The FTC and DOJ based their opposition to the QHCCA not only on
data, but also on their experience investigating previous instances of
collective bargaining by health care practitioners. 116  Even before the
Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000 debate, the agencies'
position was that measures designed to increase the power of consumer
choice, rather than physician choice, would better serve patients. 117
This position was articulated in the agencies' Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care ("Guidelines"). 11
The Guidelines established "antitrust safety zones" for nine specific
areas of the health care industry. 119 The safety zones provided guidance
114. See Kopit, supra note 45, at 109. The Patients' Bill of Rights was a series of healthcare
reforms focusing on the relationship between patients and HMOs that did not include the Quality
Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000. See id.
115. Berman, supra note 38, at 697 (noting that proponents of the QHCCA will likely
reintroduce the legislation during the 107th Congress).
116. H.R. REP. No. 106-625, at 32 (2000) (statement of Chairman Pitofsky). For example,
the FTC "has taken enforcement actions in cases in which provider groups sought to impede"
other practices by denying, delaying, or limiting hospital privileges of non-physician providers.
See id. at 33 (statement of Chairman Pitofsky).
117. Id. at 32 (statement of Chairman Pitofsky).
118. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in Health Care, Apr. 7, 2000, at 1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reportslhlth3s.htm
[hereinafter Guidelines]. The Guidelines were introduced by the agencies in 1993. Id. The latest
revisions were promulgated in 1996. Id. at 2. Although the Guidelines are not law, they are
nonetheless important because they spell out the thoughts of the two federal agencies most
responsible for law enforcement. See Monroe & Seitz, supra note 100, at 71-72.
119. See Remis, supra note 44, at 119-21 (evaluating an earlier version of the Guidelines,
which included six specific areas). The nine specific areas are listed in the table of contents of the
Guidelines:
Statement I - Mergers Among Hospitals
Statement 2 - Hospital Joint Ventures Involving High Technology Or Other Expensive
Health Care Equipment
Statement 3 - Hospital Joint Ventures Specialized Clinical Or Other Expensive Health
Care Services
Statement 4 - Providers' Collective Provision Of Non-Fee-Related Information To
Purchasers Of Health Care Services
Statement 5 - Providers' Collective Provision Of Fee-Related Information To
Purchasers Of Health Care Services
Statement 6 - Provider Participation In Exchanges Of Price And Cost Information
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to industry participants by describing conduct that the agencies would
not challenge under the antitrust laws absent extraordinary
circumstances. 120  Moreover, the conduct falling outside of these safety
zones would not immediately be considered per se unlawful. 12  Rather,
the agencies would evaluate the conduct under the "rule of reason" to
determine whether the joint venture was likely to have procompetitive
benefits that outweigh the anticompetitive potential. 122  Essentially, if
procompetitive gains could be shown and physicians operated their joint
ventures within the Guidelines, they could avoid antitrust liability. 1
23
C. Attempts at State Regulation Through the State Action Doctrine
1. The State Action Doctrine
Attempts have been made at the state level to give physicians the
right to collectively bargain through the judicially created state action
doctrine. 124  This doctrine, first articulated by the Supreme Court in
Parker v. Brown, 125 gives states the authority to supplant competition
with state regulation. 126  This doctrine originally exempted state and
local government regulations from federal antitrust liability, even if the
Statement 7 - Joint Purchasing Arrangements Among Health Care Providers
Statement 8 - Physician Network Joint Ventures
Statement 9 - Multiprovider Networks
Guidelines, supra note 118, at I (Table of Contents).
120. Guidelines, supra note 118, at 3. The agencies anticipate that extraordinary
circumstances warranting a challenge to conduct that falls inside the safety zone will be rare. Id.
at4 n.1.
121. Id. at 3. The individual statements themselves note the analysis that the agencies will use
in reviewing conduct that falls outside of the safety zone. Id.
122. Id. This flexible rule of reason approach takes into account the relevant market, the
remaining competition in the market, effect of exclusivity and non-exclusivity of venture, a
determination of the efficiencies, and other similar factual matters. See Monroe & Seitz, supra
note 100, at 89; see also Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (holding
that the rule of reason test is whether the restraint promotes or suppresses competition).
123. See Guidelines, supra note 118.
124. Kopit, supra note 45, at 118. It is important to note that many state attempts were
originally based on AMA model legislation. See Editorial, A right to talk in Texas,
AMEDNEWS.COM (Apr. 26, 1999), at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/amn_99/
editO426.htm.
125. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, the Supreme Court held that an
anticompetitive marketing program that "derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative
command of the state" was not a violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 350.
126. Id. at 360 (holding that the Commerce Clause does not remove from the states "the
authority to regulate commerce with respect to matters of local concern, on which Congress has
not spoken").
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regulation was a clear violation of the federal antitrust laws. 127  Thus,
the doctrine stood for the proposition that federal antitrust laws should
not be used to intrude too deeply into the state regulatory process. 128
In 1980, the Supreme Court in California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 129 extended the state action doctrine to
give private actors immunity from the federal antitrust laws when they
were acting pursuant to state regulatory programs designed to supplant
competition with state regulation. 130 In Midcal, the Court invalidated a
state-authorized resale price maintenance scheme for wine pricing
because there was no state monitoring of market conditions after its
implementation. 131 The Court arrived at this result by establishing two
requirements that state regulatory programs must meet before antitrust
immunity can be conferred upon private actors. 132 First, the state must
clearly articulate and firmly express its reasons for supplanting
competition with state regulation. 133  Second, the policy must be
actively supervised by the state itself. 1
34
Most state statutes meet the Midcal "clear articulation" standard by
making an express statement of the state's intent to displace competition
with regulation. 135 Compliance with the "active supervision" prong of
the Midcal test, however, is often the subject of debate. 3 6 This second
requirement ensures that a private party's anticompetitive conduct
127. Id. at 350-51 (noting that nothing in the Sherman Act or its history suggests that the
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers from activities directed by its legislature); see
generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE § 20 (1994).
128. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 127, § 20.26.
129. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
130. See generally Sarah S. Vance, Immunity for State-Sanctioned Provider Collaboration
After Ticor, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 412 (1994) (discussing the Court's "clear articulation"
requirement).
131. While the state policy was clear, the state neither established the prices nor reviewed the
price schedules used by private parties. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06. Thus, the policy failed
because it was not actively supervised by the state. Id. at 106.
132. Id. at 105.
133. Id. (noting that "[tihe legislative policy is forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose to
permit resale price maintenance").
134. Id. Here the Court was more skeptical because the "[s]tate simply authorized price
setting and [then] enforce[d] the prices established by private parties." Id. As a result, the Court
held that this prong of the articulated test was not met. Id. at 106.
135. Vance, supra note 130, at 421. States can also choose to speak in more general policy
terms and should still pass the clear articulation requirement. Id.
136. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 (1992); Patrick
v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988).
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promotes state policy rather than the party's individual interest. 137 It
further mandates that the state exercise ultimate control over the
challenged anticompetitive conduct. 138  In other words, state officials
must have and exercise the power to review particular anticompetitive
acts of private parties and declare void those that fail to comply with the
state policy. 13
9
In Federal Trade Commission v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 140 "the
Supreme Court took its active supervision analysis a step further."' 41
The Supreme Court in Ticor held that the active supervision prong of
the Midcal test could not be met simply by empowering a state
agency. 142  The potential for active supervision is not enough, instead
the state must actually exercise this authority. 143  Specifically, if a
regulation is operating through a "negative-option" system, 144 private
parties claiming immunity must establish that state officials have "in
137. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 100-01. In Patrick, the Court held that the state action doctrine did
not protect physicians in the state of Oregon from federal antitrust liability for their activities on a
hospital peer-review committee. Id. at 105. Like Midcal, the Court here found that the state
regulatory agency did not review the private decisions rendered in the committee meetings to
determine if the decisions comported with state policy. Id. at 101. As a result, the physicians
were liable under the federal antitrust laws. Id. at 105.
138. Id. at 101. Perhaps the best way for states to show "ultimate control" is for a state to
actually use their review authority on an ongoing basis. See, e.g., DFW Metro Line Servs. v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Corp., 988 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1993); Sandy River Nursing Care Ctr. v.
Nat'l Council on Comp. Ins., 798 F. Supp. 810 (D. Me. 1992), aff'd sub nom., Sandy River
Nursing Care v. Aetna Cas., 985 F.2d 1138 (1st Cir. 1993).
139. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101.
140. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 621.
141. Vance, supra note 130, at 413. Notably, the Court held that state action immunity is
"disfavored." Ticor, 504 U.S. at 636.
142. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 638. In Ticor, private title insurance companies fixed rates in
Connecticut, Arizona, Wisconsin, and Montana through a private ratings bureau, in accordance
with state legislation. Id. at 628. The bureaus then filed their rates with the state insurance office.
Id. at 629. In Montana and Wisconsin, the rates became effective unless the state rejected them
within the specified period. Id. at 638. The Court stated that each state had a "negative option"
system. Id.
143. Id. Essentially, the state must be active enough to review the particular anticompetitive
acts of private parties to ensure that set prices are established by deliberate state intervention, and
not simply by an agreement among the parties. Id. at 634-35.
144. Id. at 638. With a negative-option type system, conduct by private parties acting under a
state regulatory regime can become effective unless it is rejected within a set time. See id. at 629.
Therefore, inaction by the state can actually constitute substantive approval by default. See id.
For example, in Wisconsin the 1981 rate filing requested an eleven percent increase. Id. at 630.
The rate increase received a cursory examination by the State Insurance Commissioner but was
not objected to even though no one in the agency inquired into the expense. Id. The rate increase
subsequently went into effect because the state did not object. Id.
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fact" actively supervised the specifics of the price-fixing scheme. 145
Without this comprehensive supervision by the state, private actors
participating in a state program will not be immune under the state
action doctrine from federal prosecution. 1
46
One positive aspect of the state action doctrine is that a state
legislature can regulate the anticompetitive conduct of private actors
free from federal intrusion.1 47 The downside is that, if done incorrectly,
private actors participating in a state program will not be immune from
federal prosecution. 148  Furthermore, the recent modifications to the
active supervision requirement developed in Ticor could potentially
deter private actors from participation in any state regulatory
program. 149  It is against this backdrop that some state legislatures
attempted to establish a right for physicians to collectively bargain. 15
0
2. The Texas Experience: Untested Legislative Changes
Texas was the first state to pass legislation under the state action
doctrine that allowed physicians to collectively bargain with MCOs
through third parties.' 51  The Joint Negotiations by Physicians with
Health Benefit Plans Act 52 sought to restore fair negotiations between
physicians and health care plans by allowing physicians to collectively
bargain with health care plans. 153
145. Id. at 638 ("The mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a
decision by the [s]tate."); see also Vance, supra note 130, at 413-14 (noting that state officials
must in fact have taken necessary steps to determine the specifics of the price-fixing scheme).
But see Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985) (noting in dicta that
"[iln cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that active state supervision would also
not be required, although we do not here decide that issue").
146. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 640. Indeed, private actors participating in state programs operating
under the state action doctrine are likely to be exposed to greater liability after Ticor than before it
because they fear prosecution. See Vance, supra note 130, at 416. In Washington State, for
example, the state medical association has been unable to induce any health plans to negotiate
with physicians over fees or pricing information because the regulating statute warns broadly
against anticompetitive practices. See Rugg, supra note 37, at 34.
147. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-52 (1943).
148. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also infra Part II.C.3 (discussing
how health care plans are not bargaining under the Washington statute).
149. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[Tihis standard will be a fertile source
of uncertainty and (hence) litigation, and will produce total abandonment of some state programs
because private individuals will not take the chance of participating in them.").
150. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Texas legislation passed after the Ticor decision).
151. Thomas Win. Mayo, Health Care Law, 53 SMU L. REV. 1101, 1114 (2000).
152. Joint Negotiations by Physicians with Health Benefit Plans Act, TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
§§ 29.01-29.14 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
153. Id. § 29.01. The Texas Legislature's purpose was to achieve fair negotiations between
physicians and the health plans. See id. Fair negotiations are unable to occur when MCOs
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Under the provisions of the Act, physicians can negotiate jointly with
MCOs over any non-financial terms and conditions of a contract. 154
Joint negotiation of fees, discounts, or fixed payments, however, is
limited to instances in which the health benefit plan has substantial
market power that either has affected or threatens to affect the quality
and availability of patient care. 155  Furthermore, when negotiations of
these financial items do occur, only ten percent of the competing
physicians in the involved MCO's geographic service area can be
represented in the negotiations. 156
The power to enforce the entire Texas Act is vested with the Office
of the Texas Attorney General, who, along with the Insurance
Commissioner, is given the authority to promulgate any rules necessary
to implement the provisions of the Act. 157 The Attorney General also
makes the determination regarding what constitutes substantial market
power 158 and is vested with the power to approve or disapprove filings,
proposed contracts, and requests to enter into joint negotiations. 159 The
failure of the Attorney General to approve or reject joint negotiations
"dominate the market to such a degree that fair negotiations ... are unobtainable absent any joint
action on behalf of physicians." Id.
154. See id. §§ 29.04-29.05. "Competing physicians within the service area of a health plan
may meet and communicate [to jointly negotiate non-financial terms and conditions]." Id.
Examples of these non-financial terms and conditions include practices and procedures to
encourage early detection of illnesses in children, clinical criteria for effective cost-efficient
disease management programs, and patient referral procedures. See id. § 29.04.
155. Id. § 29.06(a). Specifically, the items excluded from negotiation are: (1) the fees or
prices for services, (2) the conversion factors in a reimbursement methodology or similar
methodology, (3) the amount of any discount on the price of services, and (4) the dollar amount
per patient or fixed payment for health services rendered by physicians to health benefit plan
patients. Id. § 29.05.
156. Id. § 29.09(b). The joint negotiation shall represent "no more than 10 percent of the
physicians in a health benefit plan's defined geographic service area .... Id. The Texas
Attorney General may adjust this percentage. Id. A licensed physician's representative carries
out all joint negotiations between physicians and the health care plans. Id. § 29.08.
157. Id. § 29.11. On June 2, 2000, the Attorney General promulgated the final rules with
respect to the Act. See Mayo, supra note 151, at 1117 n. 115.
158. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.06(a). The term "substantial market power" is not defined in
the statute. Id. Presumably, the Attorney General will use market share as proxy for market
power in their evaluation. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (defining market share as
"the percentage of the market for a product that a firm supplies").
159. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.09. Under the provisions of the Act, these joint negotiations
are approved if the "applicants have demonstrated that the likely benefits ... outweigh the
disadvantages attributable to a reduction in competition .... " Id. § 29.09(b).
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for any reason within the statutory time period provides an applicant the
right to petition a district court for a mandamus order.
160
Under the Texas Act, the Attorney General has the power to bind
physicians to the terms of the statute by approving their request for
collective bargaining. 161  The physicians are subject to penalties for
anticompetitive behavior if their collective action falls outside the
bounds of the statute. 162 Furthermore, physicians who decide to enter
into joint negotiations under the Act are prohibited from jointly
coordinating a cessation, limitation, or reduction of their health care
services, and arguably, from striking.
163
The Texas Act was enacted into law on June 6, 2000.164 Since then,
only a few physicians filed for collective bargaining approval. 165 The
Texas Act is subject to a sunset provision and is set to expire on
September 1, 2003.166
3. Other States Introduce Legislation
By the year 2000, seventeen states had considered physician
collective bargaining legislation. 167 While Texas remains the only state
160. Id. § 29.09(d). It is interesting to note that the petition can only be filed in a specific
district court, Travis County. Id. A mandamus order would compel the Attorney General to
approve or reject the joint negotiations. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 973 (7th ed. 1999).
161. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.09(c). "An approval of the initial filing by the attorney
general shall be effective for all subsequent negotiations between the parties specified in the
initial filing." Id.
162. Id. § 29.10. "The [licensed physician's representative] ... shall warn physicians of the
potential for legal action against physicians who violate state or federal antitrust laws when acting
outside the authority of [the Act]." Id.
163. Id. The specific language states that physicians are not authorized to "jointly coordinate
any cessation, reduction, or limitation of health care services." Id. Physicians are also not
permitted to tie their participation to all areas of the health plan as a condition for participation in
any particular plan offering. Id. While this provision is a little unclear, it may be an attempt by
the state legislature to discourage physicians from striking. See Kopit, supra note 45, at 106;
Mayo, supra note 15 1, at 1116.
164. Leigh Page, State Legislatures Cool to Collective Negotiation Bills, AMEDNEWS.COM,
June 26, 2000, at http://www.ama-assn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick_00/gvsa0626.htm.
165. See AG Grants MDs Permission to Jointly Negotiate With Texas Blues, ST. HEALTH
MONITOR, Oct. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 8996343. Two years after passage, the Texas
Attorney General gave the first antitrust waiver to eleven Henderson, Texas based physicians to
conduct joint negotiations with Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas. Id.
166. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.14. This sunset provision causes the legislation to expire
without an affirmative act by the Texas legislature after three years. See Kopit, supra note 45, at
119; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the similar sunset provision in
the federal QHCCA bill).
167. See Kopit, supra note 45, at 120. The states that have considered legislation include:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
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to provide physicians with the express right to collectively bargain,
other states used the state action doctrine to exempt similar conduct in
certain situations. 168  For example, in 1995, the State of Washington
gave physicians the right to negotiate collectively, as long as they do not
negotiate fees or pricing. 169 In addition, the measure warns against
anticompetitive practices that would constitute per se violations of
federal antitrust laws.170  Because this broad warning fails to provide
specific guidance to either physicians or MCOs, Washington state has
not enjoyed much success in inducing health plans to enter into joint
negotiations. 171
Oregon provides a more limited exemption than the State of
Washington because Oregon only displaces competition among health
care providers in the heart and kidney transplant market. 172 Since these
health care providers exercise no control over supply, 173 the Oregon
legislation allows providers to form cooperative programs with each
other and with specific health care plans to ensure that transplant centers
offer high-quality services. 174  Unlike the Texas and Washington
legislation, which allows doctors to collectively negotiate the terms and
conditions of their own supply of labor, the Oregon legislation is more
West Virginia. Id. None of these measures has passed. Id.; see also Page, supra note 164. In
addition, the AMA has drafted model legislation for states to use in developing these types of
bills. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing that many state attempts were based
on the AMA model legislation).
168. See Remis, supra note 44, at 128. For example, legislation that requires insurance
companies to permit any provider willing to accept the rates agreed upon between the company
and preferred providers is a particularized form of state regulation. See id.
169. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.72.300 (West 1997). Like the Texas Legislature, the
Washington legislature wished to displace competition in situations where physician faced "legal
and market disincentives" in competing with MCOs. Id. § 43.72.300(1).
170. Id. § 43.72.300(3) ("The legislature does not... authorize any person or entity to engage
in activities... that would constitute per se violations of state and federal anti-trust laws .... ").
171. Rugg, supra note 37, at 34 (noting that public pressure ultimately forced at least one
HMO to change its provider contracts to take into account the law's processes). This is in
contrast to the legislation in Texas, where there are no reports on whether or not physicians and
other health care providers are satisfied with the new state statute. See supra note 165 and
accompanying text (describing only occasional use of the Texas statute).
172. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 442.700-442.760 (1999); see generally Remis, supra note 44, at 130
(explaining Oregon's cooperative heart and kidney transplant program).
173. Remis, supra note 44, at 130. The number of organ transplants is, of course, strictly
limited by the supply of organs. Id.
174. Id. at 130-31. The statute specifies that only Oregon Health Sciences University and
entities operating at least three hospitals in a single urban area could cooperate with health care
providers to offer high quality transplant services. OR. REV. STAT. § 442.7 10(1).
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limited because physicians exercise no control over supply, and high-
quality transplant services will likely result.
175
III. DISCUSSION
During the 91st Illinois General Assembly, Representatives Skip
Saviano, Sara Feigenholtz, and Kay Wojcik of the Illinois House
introduced House Bill 4478 (H.B. 4478), the Health Care Services
Contract Joint Discussions Act. 176  After this bill failed to pass during
the 91st General Assembly, Saviano reintroduced the legislation as
House Bill 3086 (H.B. 3086) in the 92nd General Assembly. 177 Saviano
also introduced House Bill 2115 (H.B. 2115), the Fairness in Health
Care Services Contracting Law, during the same legislative term. 178 An
alternative to H.B. 3086, H.B. 2115 endeavors to increase fairness for
all parties involved in physician-MCO contracting.
179
A. Illinois House Bill 3086
Illinois House Bill 3086, the Health Care Services Contract Joint
Discussion Act, is the second bill introduced in the Illinois General
Assembly designed to ensure that health care plans and providers work
together to provide quality health care services to MCO enrollees. 180
The primary sponsor of the bill, Representative Skip Saviano, found
175. OR. REV. STAT. § 442.705. Displacing competition in a marketplace with limited supply
would be beneficial to the public because the duplication of services in a competitive market
would be eliminated. Remis, supra note 44, at 131. This would, in turn, decrease prices for
consumers and eliminate the waste of a limited supply of organs. Id.
176. Health Care Services Contract Joint Discussions Act, H.B. 4478, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (I11. 2000).
177. H.B. 3086, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11. 2001). H.B. 4478 did not pass before the
end of the 91st General Assembly. Id. As a result, H.B. 3086 simply replaced H.B. 4478 in the
92nd General Assembly on February 28, 2001. See Illinois Chamber of Commerce, 2001 Key
Legislation, at http://www.ga.ilchamber.org/key.htm#HB4478 (last modified Jan. 8, 2002). It is
likely that both versions of the Illinois legislation and the Texas statute are based on the AMA
model legislation. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing that many states'
proposed laws were based on AMA model legislation).
178. Fairness in Health Care Services Contracting Law, H.B. 2115, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (I11. 2001). Similar legislation was passed in the Senate. S.B. 1340, 92nd Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (I11. 2001). While H.B. 3086 and H.B. 2115 both have the same goal of alleviating the
situations that independent physicians face, H.B. 2115 is more direct in that it calls for reasonable
standardization and simplification of the terms and conditions of contracts between health care
professionals and health care plans. See infra Part HI.B (discussing H.B. 2115 in greater detail).
179. II1. H.B. 2115, § 351E-5 ("The purpose of this [bill] is to provide reasonable
standardization and simplification of terms and conditions of ... health care professional or
health care provider service contracts..."); see infra Part III.B (providing a detailed discussion
of H.B. 2115).
180. I11. H.B. 3086, § 5(a).
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that the health care market lacked plan and provider cooperation
because health care plans dominate the market and do not enter into fair
discussions with health. care providers. 18 1 Furthermore, he found that
contracting organizations, including physician hospital organizations
("PHOs"), 18 2 independent practice associations ("IPAs"), 18 3 and typical
large group practices did not give health care providers an adequate
voice when discussing contract terms and conditions. 184  As a result,
H.B. 3086 calls for joint discussions between health care plans and
collective groups of health care providers. 185
Similar to the legislation in Texas, H.B. 3086 allows physicians to
bargain collectively with health plans through regulated third party
representatives. 186 These third parties can represent no more than
twenty percent of all physicians in the geographic service area of the
health care plan with whom they are negotiating.187  H.B. 3086 permits
joint discussions on non-fee related terms and conditions, such as
practices and procedures, clinical criteria and practices, administrative
181. Id. § 5(b). The impetus for the bill was that, in some instances, health care plans
dominate the "market to such a degree that fair discussions ... are unobtainable absent any joint
action on behalf of health care providers." Id. The term "health care provider" is statutorily
defined as a "physician, dentist, podiatrist, hospital, facility, or person that is licensed or
otherwise authorized to deliver health care services." Id. § 10.
182. Under a physician-hospital organization (PHO) framework, various health care
providers, including hospitals, physician groups, and sometimes other provider entities, join
together to form a network. Julie Y. Park, PHOs and the 1996 Federal Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines: Ensuring the Formation of Procompetitive Multiprovider Networks, 91 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1684, 1692 (1997). PHOs collect their private patient base together and market their
services to third party payors. Id. at 1693.
183. An independent practice association (IPA) is a physician or group of physicians that
operate like a preferred provider organization (PPO), except that an IPA is usually under contract
to an HMO. Murray S. Monroe, Health Care: Current Antitrust Issues, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 365,
380 (1993). A PPO "is a group of physicians and/or hospitals that contracts with employers,
insurance companies, and other third-party payors to provide medical services to an employee
group at reduced fees." Gary B. Wilcox, Preferred Provider Organizations: Can the Doctors Do
the Price Fixing?, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 733, 733 (1984).
184. I11. H.B. 3086, § 5(c). "The General Assembly finds ... that current mechanisms that
bring health care providers together into contracting organizations ... do not provide health care
providers with an adequate voice in discussing contract terms and conditions." Id.
185. Id. § 5(f). "It is the intention of the General Assembly to authorize health care providers
to hold joint discussions with health care plans and to qualify those joint discussions and related
joint activities for the State-action exemption to the federal antitrust laws . I..." Id.
186. Id. § 35(a). These joint discussion representatives must be licensed annually. Id. § 65(a).
Notably, physicians who decide to enter into joint negotiations and are approved by the Attorney
General are not authorized to engage in any group boycott or strike. Id. § 25(e).
187. Id. § 20(c). "The joint discussions shall represent no more than 20% of any type of
health care providers . .. except in cases where in conformance with the other provisions of this
Act conditions support the approval of a greater or lesser percentage." Id. The term "types of
health care providers" is defined based on the licenses held by the health care providers. Id.
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procedures, and patient referral procedures.' 88 The negotiation of fees,
discounts, or fixed payments is also authorized under the bill, but is
limited to situations in which the health benefit plan has substantial
market power. 189  Substantial market power exists when a health care
plan has the power to set the fee-related terms and conditions in a
manner that affects or threatens to affect the quality and availability of
patient care. 190 Substantial market power also exists when the market
share 19 1 of the health care plan exceeds fifteen percent of the patients in
the geographic area of the affected health care providers.
192
Under H.B. 3086, the Illinois Attorney General is responsible for
overseeing compliance with the bill's requirements. 193 If the Attorney
General determines that a joint discussion representative adequately
demonstrates that the benefits of joint negotiations outweigh the
disadvantages attributable to a reduction in competition, he may allow a
joint discussion to occur between the representative and the health care
plan. 194 Likewise, the Attorney General may object to any aspect prior
to the start of joint discussions. 195
188. Id. § 25(a).
189. Id. § 25(b), (c). "The Attorney General shall make the determination of what constitutes
substantial market power." Id. § 25(c); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing
how courts use market share as a proxy for market power).
190. Il1. H.B. 3086, § 25(c)(1).
191. Market share is 'the percentage of market for a product that a firm supplies." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 985 (7th ed. 1999). See supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining that
market share is traditionally a proxy for market power).
192. Ill. H.B. 3086, § 25(c)(2). H.B. 3086 vests the Illinois Attorney General with the power
to determine if this latter type of substantial market power exists. Id. When calculating this type
of market power the Attorney General should take into account "all policies and products offered
by a subsidiary, parent, and affiliate health care plans ... ." Id.
193. Id. § 20(a). "It shall be the responsibility and duty of the Attorney General to license,
supervise, and regulate joint discussion representatives." Id. The bill also creates an advisory
"Health Care Services Contracting Board," to be housed within the office of the Attorney
General. Id. § 15(a). This Board makes recommendations concerning the duties of the Attorney
General under the act. Id. § 15(e). Ultimately, however, the Attorney General has the authority
to adopt rules necessary to implement the provisions of the act. Id. § 95.
194. Id. § 20(c). Upon the request of one or more of its affected members, a joint discussion
representative may send a written communication to its members asking if they are interested in
having the representative review, comment upon, advise, or discuss the terms and conditions of a
contract. Id. § 30(a). Before engaging in any joint discussions with a health care plan, however,
the representative must furnish an initial report to the Attorney General. Id. § 30(c). Once the
Attorney General approves this, the representative can enter into joint discussions with a health
care plan. Id. § 30(f). The Attorney General is responsible for the approval of all joint discussion
material, written communications, and proposed contracts. Id. § 50(d).
195. Id. § 50(c). Once the Attorney General objects to any type of written communication, the
joint discussion representative works with the physicians that he represents to arrive at a
resolution. Id. If a resolution is reached, the Attorney General may require the joint discussion
representative to send members an additional written notice confirming this resolution. Id.
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Once joint negotiations have been approved, all written
communications between the joint discussion representative and the
health care plan must be filed with the Attorney General for review. 196
If the Attorney General finds any terms or conditions within a contract
to be anticompetitive, he may object to the proposed contract. 197
Conversely, if the proposed contract will result in procompetitive gains
for consumers, the contract will be approved. 198 Finally, the Attorney
General has the discretion to investigate compliance with H.B. 3086
after the approval of the joint negotiation. 199
From start to finish, H.B. 3086 operates under a "negative-option"
scheme 200  for approval of the items submitted to the Attorney
General. 20 1 The Attorney General's office must notify the parties to the
negotiation within twenty days if it objects to a communication.202
Approval is granted to the negotiating parties if the Attorney General
fails to take action within this period of time.2
03
After the introduction of H.B. 3086, the Illinois House referred the
legislation to the House Committee on Rules. 204  The bill was then
196. Id. § 50(a). The Attorney General must also review all items of negotiation, such as
proposed contracts, to ensure that they do not contain any terms or conditions prohibited by the
bill. Id. § 50(b).
197. Id. An indication of excessive and unfair payments from one side to another or an
escalation of the cost of health care are indicative of anticompetitive harm arising from the
transaction. Id. § 50(e). If such an item is disapproved during joint negotiations, the Attorney
General must provide a written explanation to the parties as to how to correct the deficiency. Id.
§ 50(b). If the deficiency is not able to be corrected, the objection is a final administrative
decision and is subject to appeal under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law. Id. §
50(c).
198. Id. § 50(d). Procompetitive effects include, but are not limited to, restoration of a
competitive balance in the market, protections of access to quality patient care, promotion of the
health care infrastructure, and improved communications between health care providers and
health care plans. Id. § 50(e).
199. Id. § 90. "The Attorney General, at any time after a written communication or proposed
contract... is filed or approved ... may... [investigate] compliance with this Act." Id.
200. With a negative-option type system, conduct by private parties acting under a state
regulatory regime can become effective unless it is rejected within a set time. Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 629 (1992). Therefore, inaction by the state can
actually constitute substantive approval by default. Id.; see also supra note 144 and
accompanying text (explaining in detail a negative-option type scheme).
201. Ill. H.B. 3086, § 50(a). The same system operates in respect to the approval and review
of proposed contracts. Id. § 55(a).
202. Id. § 50(a). "Approval of the written communication shall be deemed to have been
granted if the Attorney General does not take any action within the 20 day period." Id.
203. Id.
204. Status of H.B.3086, http://www.legis.state.il.us/scripts/imstran.exe?LIBSINCBHB3086
(last visited Jan. 28, 2002). After its introduction on February 28, 2001, the bill was referred to
the House Committee on Rules. Id.
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assigned to the House Committee on Labor one day later.20 5 On March
16, 2001, H.B. 3086 was re-referred to the House Committee, where it
is still being debated. 0 6
B. Illinois House Bill 2115
A few months after H.B. 3086 was introduced, Representative
Saviano introduced Illinois House Bill 2115, the Fairness in Health Care
Services Contracting Law, in the House as an alternative to H.B.
3086.207 Legislators designed H.B. 2115 to alleviate the difficulties that
independent physicians face in the health care industry.20 8  H.B. 2115
calls for the reasonable standardization and simplification of the terms
and conditions of contracts between health care professionals, such as
physicians and health care plans. 209 Furthermore, H.B. 2115 aims to
eliminate contract provisions that may be unfair, deceptive, misleading,
or unreasonably confusing in connection with the services covered,
reimbursement, or payment to health care providers for those
services. 210
H.B. 2115 prevents unilateral changes by health care plans to the
terms and conditions of their contracts with health care providers. 211
The bill prohibits a health care plan from mandating that a physician
serve on, or accept reimbursement from, another health care plan as a
condition of a contract.21 2 Furthermore, H.B. 2115 requires that certain
provisions be included in every contract between a health care provider
and a physician. 213  In addition, terms and conditions related to
205. Id.
206. Status of H.B.3086, http://www.legis.state.il.us/scripts/imstran.exe?LIBSINCBHB3086
(last visited Jan. 28, 2002).
207. Fairness in Health Care Services Contracting Law, H.B. 2115, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (I11. 2001). Senator Robert Madigan of the Illinois Senate introduced similar legislation.
S.B. 1340, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I1. 2001).
208. Physicians perceived that they were being handed "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts by the
dominant MCOs in the health care industry. See supra note 45 and accompanying text
(discussing the one-sidedness of "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts in favor of the MCOs).
209. Ill. H.B. 2115, § 351E-5.
210. Id.; see supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the development of "take-it-or-
leave-it" contracts).
211. Ill. H.B. 2115, § 351E-15(h). "A contract, term, condition, or policy... may not be
unilateral concerning termination, indemnification, or arbitration." Id.
212. Id. § 351E-15(b). "A contract term ... may not mandate or require a health care
professional ... as a condition of participation ... to also serve on another professional or
provider panel or accept reimbursement for another plan or contract of the company." Id.
213. Id. § 351E-25. For instance, some of these provisions include: a "medically necessary"
and "medical necessity" term that gives the physician the right to prescribe reasonable treatment
to patients; a "direct responsibility" provision making the physician's right to payment a direct
responsibility of the health care plan; and a "noncovered services" provision that gives physicians
20021
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termination, indemnification, or arbitration must apply equally to both
the health care plan and the health care professional.2 14
H.B. 2115 was incorporated into Senate Joint Resolution 33.25 This
resolution calls for a joint task force to investigate the ultimate impact
of H.B. 2115 and similar legislation on patients in Illinois. 216  It also
calls for public input to determine if any modifications must be made to
H.B. 2115 before the bill becomes law. 217  In addition, the resolution
has established a task force to study H.B. 2115 and charged this group
to examine the entire health plan and professional services contracting
process. 218  At this time it is unclear what impact task force meetings
will have on the current form of the legislation. 219
IV. ANALYSIS
Providing an exemption to the federal antitrust laws through the state
action doctrine is not the best solution for a constantly evolving industry
like health care. At a minimum, there are serious concerns as to
whether H.B. 3086 comports with both requirements of the state action
exemption.220  The mere possibility that the state may fail to comply
with the active supervision requirement of the state action doctrine
could deter private actors from risking participation in Illinois' health
care joint discussion program. 221 Moreover, Illinois' blanket exemption
from the federal antitrust laws is overly broad in terms of policy. 2 2
Current federal guidelines provide an adequate sword for physicians to
the right to bill and collect payments from patients if the services rendered are not covered as part
of the contract. Id.
214. Id. § 351E- 15(h). "A contract term, condition, or policy, either formal or informal, may
not be unilateral concerning termination, indemnification, or arbitration. These provisions shall
all apply equally to both the company and [the] health care professional or health care provider."
Id.
215. See S.J. Res. 33, 92nd Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2001) (creating the Illinois Legislative Task
Force on Fairness in Health Care Services Contracting).
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Id. Included in this task force are not only the General Assembly members sponsoring
the bill, but also members of physician organizations, MCOs, and patient care representatives. Id.
219. This task force will hold meetings and make recommendations to the General Assembly
by January 15, 2002. Id.
220. See infra Part IV.A. 1-2 (analyzing whether H.B. 3086 comports with the requirements of
the state action doctrine).
221. See infra Part IV.A.2 (examining whether private actors would risk the liability for
participation in joint negotiations when the state regulation may not comport with the active
supervision requirement of the Midcal test).
222. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that H.B. 3086 is overly broad from a policy standpoint
because the FTC/DOJ Guidelines do an adequate job of ensuring that patients receive quality care
and countervailing power is difficult to constrain).
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use in negotiating with both small and large MCOs. 223  With this
blanket exemption, it is the physicians who gain the upper hand in
negotiations, particularly when dealing with smaller MCOs in many
areas of the state. 2 4  Indeed, this shift in power is antithetical to the
purpose of the legislation, which is to ensure that patients receive
quality health care coverage in the state. 225  In contrast, H.B, 2115 is a
direct solution to the problems plaguing the health care industry and is a
better solution for Illinois to adopt.22
6
A. Illinois House Bill 3086 Does Not Comply
with the State Action Doctrine
It is not clear whether H.B. 3086 meets both requirements of the
Midcal test. 227  As discussed previously, the state must not only
articulate a clear and affirmative policy, but it must also actively
supervise the anticompetitive conduct of private actors to satisfy the
doctrine. 228  H.B. 3086 meets the clear articulation requirement. 229
However, the bill does not meet the active supervision requirement as
set forth in Ticor.230
1. The Clear Articulation Requirement
Illinois House Bill 3086 meets the clear articulation requirement of
the Midcal test. Section 5 of the bill promulgates various reasons that
Illinois wishes to displace competition with state regulation. 231
223. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing how the FTC/DOJ Guidelines do an adequate job of
ensuring that patients receive quality care).
224. See infra Part IV.B.2 (exploring how countervailing power is difficult to constrain).
225. Health Care Services Contract Joint Discussions Act, H.B. 3086, 92nd Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. § 5(a) (I11. 2001); see also infra Part IV.B.2 (explaining that H.B. 3086 would result in
higher prices for patients without any guarantee of increased quality).
226. See H.B. 2115, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11. 2001); see also infra Part IV.C
(analyzing how H.B. 2115 is a more direct approach to the problems facing the health care
industry).
227. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980); see also supra Part II.C. 1 (explaining the requirements of the Midcal test).
228. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105; see also supra Part II.C.I (discussing the clear articulation and
active supervision requirements of the state action doctrine).
229. See infra Part V.A.I (noting that H.B. 3086 complies with the clear articulation
requirement of the Midcal test).
230. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 (1992); see infra Part
IV.A.2 (stating that H.B. 3086 does not meet the active supervision requirement of the Midcal
test).
231. Health Care Services Contract Joint Discussions Act, H.B. 3086, 92nd Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. § 5 (I11. 2001). Specifically, section 5 notes that the purpose of the legislation is to
empower competing health care providers to hold joint discussions with health care plans and to
help restore the competitive balance. Id. § 5(d).
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Moreover, H.B. 3086 specifically mentions the state action doctrine
twice in the actual text of the bill. 232  Accordingly, H.B. 3086
adequately articulates that the state intends to supplant competition with
regulation. 233  However, the active supervision requirement must also
be considered.234
2. The Active Supervision Requirement
Illinois House Bill 3086 does not meet the active supervision prong
of the Midcal test.235 In Ticor, the Supreme Court tightened the active
supervision requirement set forth in Midcal, holding that state regulators
must both possess and exercise their authority against potential
anticompetitive conduct.236 Compared to Illinois, the Texas collective
bargaining legislation provides for this active supervision by requiring
that the Attorney General either approve or disapprove of the work
product of collective negotiations. 237 In the event that this authority is
not exercised, the only way for the private parties to go forward is to
obtain a writ of mandamus from the district court. 238
Unlike the Texas legislation, H.B. 3086 proposes a negative-option
scheme. 239 Under the bill, automatic approval of the work product of a
232. Id. In section 5 of H.B. 3086, the General Assembly states its intent to "qualify ... joint
discussions and ... joint activities for the State-action exemption to the federal antitrust laws
through the articulated State policy and active supervision ... in th[e] Act." Id. § 5(f). In section
80, the General Assembly again states its intent to operate under the "State-action immunity
under federal antitrust laws." Id. § 80(b).
233. See id. § 5.
234. See infra Part IV.A.2 (discussing how H.B. 3086 does not meet the active supervision
requirement of the Midcal test).
235. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980); see
also supra Part II.C. I (discussing the active supervision requirement of the Midcal test).
236. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 634 (1992). In Ticor, the
Court held that "[tihe mere potential for state supervision is not an adequate substitute for a
decision by the State." Id. at 638; see also supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text
(emphasizing the active supervision requirement).
237. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.09(d) (Vernon Supp. 2002). In Texas, a joint discussion
representative "shall have the right to petition a district court for a mandamus order requiring the
attorney general to approve or disapprove the contents of the filing forthwith." Id.; see also supra
note 160 and accompanying text (noting that a petition can be filed only in district court in Travis
County and explaining the effect of a mandamus order).
238. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.09(d). A mandamus order from the district court of Travis
County would compel the Attorney General to either approve or disapprove of the filing. Id.; see
also supra note 160 and accompanying text (noting that a petition can be filed only in district
court in Travis County and explaining the effect of a mandamus order).
239. See Health Care Services Contract Joint Discussions Act, H.B. 3086, 92nd Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. § 50(a) (I11. 2001). In a negative-option system, conduct by private parties acting
under a state regulatory regime can become effective unless the conduct is rejected within a set
time. See Ticor, 504 U.S. at 629. Accordingly, inaction by the state can actually constitute
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joint discussion occurs within twenty days, if the Illinois Attorney
General does not take any action against it.240  This negative-option
scheme mirrors the one at issue in Ticor, where the Supreme Court held
that private parties claiming immunity must establish that state officials
have taken affirmative steps to determine the specific details of the
price-fixing scheme. 2
4 1
In addition, it is not clear what level of ongoing supervision is
required under the new guidelines set forth in Ticor.242  Because this
level of supervision is an open question, Illinois should establish
monitoring guidelines as part of its legislation. 243 However, H.B. 3086
dictates only that the Attorney General has the option to investigate
compliance with the act after approval of the joint negotiation; thus,
investigation does not appear to be mandatory.244  Likewise, it is not
clear that the Attorney General has the authority to either rescind
approval or void the contract. 245  If Illinois fails to monitor the
negotiation scheme, it will not meet the requirements articulated in
Ticor.2
4 6
It is not clear that H.B. 3086 comports with the active supervision
requirement of Midcal and Ticor.247 Therefore, many health care
providers will simply choose not to participate in joint negotiations for
fear that the state's supervision will be inadequate thereby potentially
substantive approval by default. Id.; see also supra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing
negative-option systems).
240. I11. H.B. 3086, § 50(a); see supra note 202 and accompanying text (noting that approval
is "deemed to have been granted if the Attorney General does not take any action within the
[twenty] day period").
241. Ticor, 504 U.S. at 638; see supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's holding in Ticor).
242. Compare David L. Meyer & Charles F. Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not
Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 210 (1994) (noting that
"there remains serious doubt whether the private parties' ongoing conduct will be insulated by the
initial state authorization if the state regulators do not actively oversee the parties' transactions"),
with Vance, supra note 130, at 428 (noting that the Court in Ticor did not use terminology to
indicate that ongoing supervision was required).
243. Vance, supra note 130, at 428. For example, the FTC has interpreted Ticor as requiring
ongoing supervision. Id. at 419. Courts have yet to rule on the issue, however. Id.
244. Ill. H.B. 3086, § 90; see supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the Attorney
General's discretion to review filed or approved contracts or communications under H.B. 3086).
245. See Ill. H.B. 3086, § 90; see supra note 199 and accompanying text (noting that section
90 provides only that the Attorney General has the power to investigate a written communication
or proposed contract's compliance once it has been filed or approved).
246. See Vance, supra note 130, at 428 (noting that states that do not monitor in fact fail to
meet the Ticor requirement).
247. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 640-41 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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exposing participants to liability under federal antitrust laws.248  If this
is the case, H.B. 3086, if passed, will lie dormant as similar legislation
has in the State of Washington. 249 Any potential that the legislation has
will go unrealized, and the disproportionate status quo will be
maintained in the health care industry. 250
B. H.B. 3086 is Too Broad from a Policy Standpoint
Even if Illinois' joint negotiation legislation satisfied the state action
doctrine requirements, it is still too broad from a policy standpoint.
Under H.B. 3086, Illinois wants to ensure that the quality of services
increases for all interested parties in the industry. 251  However, the
creation of a specific and complex scheme of collective bargaining will
increase both the time spent negotiating and the cost of those
negotiations. 252 Instead, physicians should utilize the current FTC/DOJ
Guidelines to their fullest potential in place of adopting a scheme rife
with the "red tape" of bureaucracy. 253  The use of the Guidelines will
adequately ensure that benefits result for patients. 254  Furthermore,
creation of a countervailing power in the health care marketplace will
not serve to benefit either patients or less dominant health care plans. 255
Indeed, without the proper constraints, physicians, armed with the
knowledge of what their competitors charge, can use this leverage
against small health care plans as well as against larger ones. 256
248. Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., concurring); see supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that
private actors participating in state programs operating under the state action doctrine are likely to
be exposed to greater liability after Ticor than before it).
249. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.72.300 (West 2000); see supra note 169 and
accompanying text (discussing the aim of the Washington legislation).
250. See Kopit, supra note 45, at 102 (noting that "[t]here can be little question that individual
physicians ... feel powerless to negotiate with large [MCOs]"); see also supra Part IL.A
(discussing the current situation in the health care industry).
251. Health Care Services Contract Joint Discussions Act, H.B. 3086, 92nd Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. § 5(d) (II1. 2001) (stating that the purpose of the legislation is to ensure that "benefits
[result] for consumers, health care providers, and less dominant health care plans").
252. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 242, at 201 (noting that most efforts to codify narrow
scopes of immunity simply substitute a set of complex definitional uncertainties).
253. See infra Part IV.B. 1 (discussing how the established Guidelines do an adequate job of
ensuring that patients receive quality health care).
254. See infra Part IV.B. I (stating that the Guidelines, if used to their fullest potential, protect
physicians and ensure that benefits result for patients).
255. See infra Part IV.B.2 (examining how countervailing power is difficult to constrain).
256. See infra Part IV.B.2 (noting that collective bargaining gives knowledge to all
participants who then use this knowledge to squeeze profits from smaller, less competitive
MCOs).
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1. The FTC/DOJ Guidelines Ensure That Patients Receive Quality
Health Care
In contrast to H.B. 3086, the current FTC/DOJ Guidelines are
flexible enough to adapt to a changing health care system.257  If utilized
to their fullest potential, the Guidelines can also ensure that patients
receive quality health care.258  First, private collaborators who wish to
achieve high-quality patient care can utilize the Guidelines to their
advantage.2 59  For example, federal antitrust enforcers will not
challenge physicians who jointly discuss with health care plans non-
economic issues, such as the collection of outcome data, suggested
practice parameters, and even suggested assurances from MCOs that
they will not second-guess physicians about the care of patients.260
Second, the Guidelines allow groups of physicians and hospitals to
form networks to negotiate with insurers through a third party
messenger. 261 Such "messenger models" can pass muster only if they
provide objective or empirical information about the terms of an offer,
are not coercive, and allow physicians to make their own decisions as to
whether to sign the contract with a provider. 262
Third, the FTC/DOJ Guidelines implicitly state that physician
network joint ventures 263 ("PNJVs") that are structured with regard to
the antitrust rules are even less likely to receive antitrust scrutiny. 264 A
257. See generally Guidelines, supra note 118.
258. Id.; see also supra Part H.B.3 (providing a general explanation of the Guidelines).
259. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 242, at 171 (stating that the federal antitrust laws are
aimed at achieving a more efficient and less costly delivery of health care services).
260. Guidelines, supra note 118, at 14-15 (stated in section "Providers' Collective Provision
Of Non-Fee-Related Information To Purchasers Of Health Care Services").
261. Lutsky, supra note 3, at 85. The Guidelines allow groups of independent physicians and
hospitals to form negotiation networks through third party "messengers." Id. These messengers
are not allowed to share information with member physicians or to collectively bargain on behalf
of them. See id. They can, however, be valuable because messengers who represent large
numbers of physicians can use their leverage to gain higher rates from the health care plans. Id.
262. Id. at 86. Indeed, physicians could "unionize" to the extent of this messenger model as
long as the model does not interfere with physicians' own independent decision on whether to
sign a contract with the MCOs. Id.
263. A physician network joint venture (PNJV) is any organization of doctors designed to
market their services to health plans. Guidelines, supra note 118, at 22. PNJVs can take the form
of IPAs or PPOs. Id. A preferred provider organization "is a group of physicians and/or
hospitals that contracts with employers, insurance companies, and other third party payors to
provide medical services to an employee group at reduced fees." Wilcox, supra note 183, at 733.
An independent practice association (IPA) is a physician or group of physicians that operate like a
preferred provider organization (PPO), except that an IPA is usually under contract to an HMO.
Monroe, supra note 183, at 380.
264. Meyer & Rule, supra note 242, at 192 ("Indeed, the [FTC and DOJ] have long
encouraged parties to consider joint ventures as a procompetitive alternative to outright merger.");
20021
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PNJV is allowed to collectively bargain with MCOs under the
Guidelines if (1) the PNJV participants share a substantial financial risk
in the operation and (.2) the size of the operation falls within one of two
safety zones for PNJVs. 265 A PNJV will be evaluated under the rule of
reason26 if it falls outside of these safety zones.2 67
A properly structured preferred provider organization ("PPO")268 is
but one example of a PNJV that avoids challenge as a violation of the
antitrust laws. 269  A PPO is beneficial to physicians because it allows
physicians to retain the autonomy and authority provided by the
historical doctor-patient relationship. 270 Likewise, consumers, insurers,
and employers are also attracted to PPOs 27 1 Indeed, competitive PPOs
can motivate financially vested physicians to work from within to seek a
see also Berman, supra note 38, at 706 ("The Guidelines clearly state ... that the government
will challenge joint ventures... when they serve only as shams for cartel-like price fixing.").
265. Guidelines, supra note 118, at 23. If the PNJV is exclusive (i.e. the network's physician
participants are restricted in their ability to individually contract or affiliate with other PNJVs or
MCOs), then it will qualify for the safety zone if it does not constitute more than twenty percent
of the "physicians in each physician specialty ... who practice in the relevant geographic
market." Id. A non-exclusive PNJV, however, cannot constitute more than thirty percent of the
same market group. Id.; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text (describing the general
principles of safety zones).
266. Analysis under the "rule of reason" test considers market conditions, procompetitive
justifications, effects of the agreement, and other relevant facts. See Monroe & Seitz, supra note
100, at 89; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (describing how the rule of reason test
evaluates whether competition is procompetitive or anticompetitive).
267. Guidelines, supra note 118, at 25 (stated in section "Determining When Agreements
Among Physicians In A Physician Network Joint Venture Are Analyzed Under the Rule Of
Reason"). In fact, some commentators note that the agencies' articulated standards are "arguably
more restrictive than the realities of the agencies' enforcement practices." Meyer & Rule, supra
note 242, at 204.
268. A preferred provider organization is "a group of physicians and/or hospitals that
contracts with employers, insurance companies, and other third party payors to provide medical
services to an employee group at reduced fees." Wilcox, supra note 183, at 733.
269. Guidelines, supra note 118, at 31. Still, there is no general immunity for the health care
marketplace. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982). Therefore,
physicians must structure their PPOs within the Guidelines and within the general antitrust laws
to avoid being challenged. See generally Wilcox, supra note 183, at 743-52 (discussing how
physician-sponsored preferred provider organizations can be an effective cost-reduction delivery
system).
270. Wilcox, supra note 183, at 733; see also supra note 31 and accompanying text
(discussing the doctor-patient relationship under the fee-for-service system).
271. Wilcox, supra note 183, at 733.
Consumers are attracted to PPOs because they are not locked-in to a specific group of
providers as they are with HMO memberships. Insurers obviously favor dealing with
PPOs over traditional indemnity arrangements because of the discounts granted.
Employers view PPOs as a means for influencing the delivery of medical care to better
provide for their insured employees.
Id. at 734 (footnotes omitted).
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return on capital by lowering prices, reducing costs, and providing other
pro-consumer efficiencies. 27 2 In short, properly structured PPOs can act
as a vehicle for collective negotiation with MCOs while also benefiting
the industry because they encourage both competition and cost-
effectiveness. 273
In contrast to the FTC/DOJ Guidelines, Illinois' joint negotiation
legislation is so structured and complex that it does not provide for an
alternative to MCOs. 27 4 Physicians authorized to jointly negotiate with
health care providers under H.B. 3086 would have no incentive to enter
into more beneficial joint ventures because competition would not exist
to make that choice necessary. 275  H.B. 3086's attempt at fixing the
problem would inevitably protect conduct that poses legitimate threats
to the benefits of competition. 276 Because H.B. 3086 would hamper the
expansion of new industry models and maintain the status quo, it is not
flexible enough to be introduced into such a dynamic industry.277
Moreover, portions of H.B. 3086 are simply a more stringent
codification of the existing FTC/DOJ Guidelines. For example, the
Guidelines allow physicians to jointly negotiate with health care plans
regarding non-fee related information because these types of
negotiations do not raise anticompetitive concerns. 27 8  Indeed, the
Guidelines require a showing of the negotiation's procompetitive nature
272. See Guidelines, supra note 118, at 26 (stated in section "Determining When Agreements
Among Physicians In A Physician Network Joint Venture Are Analyzed Under the Rule Of
Reason").
273. See Segars, supra note 37, at 1317; Wilcox, supra note 183, at 734.
274. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 242, at 198. Flexibility is important in antitrust analysis
because the application of the antitrust laws is an inherently fact-intensive process. See id.
Sweeping too broadly in either direction, as static legislation might do, "would occasion
excessive harm to the competitive process." Id.
275. Id. at 184. Conversely, "both the FTC and the Antitrust Division [of the DOJ] have acted
on several occasions to ... encourage rather than prohibit or chill the formation of efficient
provider networks." Id.
276. Id. at 201.
277. See U.S. Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement
Policy in Health Care, Separate Statement of Commissioner Christine A. Varney On the Revised
Health Care Guidelines, Apr. 7, 2000, at 1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm
[hereinafter Varney] (noting that the health care industry is undergoing rapid change).
278. See Guidelines, supra note 118, at 14-15 (stated in section "Providers' Collective
Provision of Non-fee Related Information to Purchasers of Health Care Services"). Generally,
disclosure of non-fee related information to competitors is procompetitive because it may
improve a health care purchaser's resolution of issues relating to the mode, quality, or efficiency
of treatment. Id.
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only if the negotiations are challenged. 79  Similarly, H.B. 3086
authorizes health care providers to meet collectively with health care
plans to discuss practices and procedures that do not focus on fee-
related terms and conditions. 280  In contrast, H.B. 3086 authorizes these
types of joint discussions with the caveat that the Attorney General must
approve them. 281 This process is unduly burdensome to both parties and
may actually increase the transactional cost of negotiations, which will
ultimately be passed on to consumers.
282
The proposals in H.B. 3086 increase the safety zones for
collaboration to untested levels in the health care industry. 283  Joint
discussions might also expand to untested levels when the allocated
percentage of twenty percent is exceeded.284 Conversely, the FTC/DOJ
Guidelines are time-tested and have been revised to ensure that they
adequately meet the needs of a changing marketplace. 285  In short, the
safety zones provided in the Guidelines are the result of FTC and DOJ
action in monitoring the health care market through its many complex
changes. 286  These efforts should be relied upon to encourage
innovation and benefit consumers in the health care marketplace.
Finally, H.B. 3086 is not subject to a sunset provision. 287 The Illinois
General Assembly is not required to revisit the legislation to determine
279. Id. at 15. This is because, generally, a provider's collective provision of certain types of
information to a purchaser is likely either to raise little risk of anticompetitive effects or to
provide procompetitive benefits. Id.
280. Health Care Services Contract Joint Discussions Act, H.B. 3086, 92nd Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. § 25 (Ill. 2001); see supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing how H.B. 3086
permits joint discussions on items such as procedures and clinical criteria).
281. Ill. H.B. 3086, § 50(d). Indeed, the codification of the Guidelines as rules is likely to
"increase the likelihood that conduct outside the scope of immunity will be regarded as raising
more serious antitrust risks." See Meyer & Rule, supra note 242, at 202.
282. See H.R. REP. No. 106-625, at 37-38 (2000) (statement of Chairman Pitofsky)
("[E]conomic theory predicts that a significant industry-wide increase in input costs will
ordinarily raise the price of the final product.").
283. Compare TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.09 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (noting that joint
negotiation can only represent 10% of the physicians in an MCO's geographic area), with I11.
H.B. 3086, § 20(c) (noting that joint negotiation can be carried out with 20% of the physicians in
the geographic area).
284. Ill. H.B. 3086, § 20(c); see supra note 187 and accompanying text (explaining that joint
discussions may involve no more than 20% of any type of health care provider).
285. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 242, at 186 n.60 (discussing how safe harbors for PNJVs
have been revised under the Guidelines). Originally, a safety zone was instituted for PPOs at
20% in the mid-1980s. Id. The safe harbor was increased to 35% a few years later. Id. The
1996 Guidelines reinstated the standard 20% safety zone. See Guidelines, supra note 118.
286. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 242, at 186 n.60.
287. See Kopit, supra note 45, at 119-20. A sunset provision causes the legislation to expire
without an affirmative act by a legislative body after a set amount of time. Id.; see also supra
note 108 and accompanying text (defining a sunset provision).
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whether the bill resulted in efficiencies in the industry or in
anticompetitive harm to the consumer. In contrast, the FTC/DOJ
Guidelines are revised periodically. 28 8 H.B. 3086 also differs from the
legislation adopted in Texas, which requires the legislature to revisit the
provisions of the bill three years from the date of its enactment.289  A
similar sunset provision also appeared in the QHCCA, which failed at
the federal level. 29
°
Ultimately, the FTC/DOJ Guidelines are a flexible approach to the
issues that arise in a dynamic industry.291 The two principal antitrust
enforcement agencies, the FTC and the DOJ, recognize that a dynamic
industry should follow guidelines, instead of rules, to minimize the
uncertainty facing participants in the health care market. 292  When
conduct crosses the line from being procompetitive to anticompetitive,
courts can use the Guidelines as persuasive authority and evaluate the
conduct under the rule of reason, a fact-intensive and fair standard for
both parties to a joint venture. 293  Indeed, with sound advice from
experienced antitrust counsel, the Guidelines provide a more
appropriate framework than H.B. 3086 for all types of collaborative
ventures among physicians.
294
2. Countervailing Power is Difficult to Constrain
H.B. 3086 inadequately addresses the problems facing the health care
industry for a second reason. Specifically, H.B. 3086 fails to take into
account the fact that countervailing power295 is difficult to constrain.
Once small sellers are able to join together and exercise countervailing
power against a dominant buyer, total power in the industry may shift to
288. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 242, at 186 n.60 (discussing the changes made to the
FTC/DOJ Guidelines).
289. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 29.14 (Vernon Supp. 2002); see supra note 166 and
accompanying text (discussing the sunset legislation of the Texas legislation).
290. See Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000, H.R. 1304, 106th Cong.; see also supra
note 108 and accompanying text (discussing the sunset provision in the QHCCA).
291. Varney, supra note 277, at I (noting that the revised health care guidelines address her
concerns for an industry undergoing rapid change).
292. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 242, at 198.
293. See id. at 209 ("A mere desire to substitute the judgment of state regulators concerning
the proper application of competitive principles for that of the federal courts and enforcement
agencies [is not enough] ... to supplant the federal antitrust laws.").
294. Id. at 184.
295. The term "countervailing power" refers to power that the legislature could grant to
physicians to exert force against a dominant MCO. See supra note 8 and accompanying text
(defining countervailing leverage as the exertion of force against an opposing force or influence).
2002]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 33
the sellers. 296 This shift pushes costs higher than the rate at which the
market would dictate if neither side possessed market power. 297
Moreover, physicians who join together can wield their collective
power against small or weak MCOs. 298  Clearly, this collective power
cannot be exercised through the negotiations themselves. 299  It can
occur unilaterally because H.B. 3086 requires that information
regarding a joint negotiation's terms and conditions be distributed to the
health care providers involved in the transaction. 300 Thus, physicians
armed with the knowledge of their competitors' negotiated prices can
leverage this information against smaller health care plans in the
geographic area. Accordingly, higher prices for patients are a likely
consequence when physicians are allowed to exercise countervailing
power against smaller MCOs. 301
Higher prices produced by the exercise of this countervailing power
by physicians also come without a guarantee of increased quality in
health care. 30 2 The information that the FTC and DOJ provided to the
House Committee reviewing the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of
2000 is applicable to this issue as well.30 3 Specifically, it is likely that
the number of market participants per region in Illinois varies as widely
as it does all across the country. 304 Therefore, Illinois' joint negotiation
legislation rests on theoretical assumptions that fail to accurately
296. See Grimes, supra note 45, at 200 ("Collective action to create countervailing power may
create power beyond what is necessary to confront a power buyer or seller; that power may be
indiscriminately exercised against the small and vulnerable as well as the power player.").
297. Id. For all practical purposes, market share is an adequate proxy for market power. See
supra note 70 and accompanying text (explaining that courts use market share as proxy for
market power in their evaluation).
298. See Grimes, supra note 45, at 200.
299. See H.B. 3086, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 20(c) (Ill. 2001). In order for
negotiations to occur, an MCO must have a substantial market share. Id. It is unlikely that small
buyers will have a "substantial market share" Id.
300. Id. § 35(a); see supra note 194 and accompanying text (noting that joint discussion
representatives can informally resolve disputes among those whom they represent).
301. Grimes, supra note 45, at 210. The direct consequence of countervailing power in the
hands of small sellers is to increase the price paid by buyers, at least some of which is passed on
to the buyer's customers. Id.
302. See id. (noting that higher prices are only bad when they do not come with an increase in
choice or quality).
303. See H.R. REP. No. 106-625, at 30 (2000) (statement of Chairman Pitofsky); Id.
(statement of Assistant Attorney General Klein); see also supra notes 100-05 and accompanying
text (examining the testimony that the FTC and DOJ presented to the House Judiciary Committee
reviewing the Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 2000).
304. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 106-625, at 45-46 (statement of Assistant Attorney General
Klein) (noting that managed care markets are constantly changing and that more than 150 new
MCOs were licensed to operate in the United States between 1994 and 1997).
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describe most health care markets in the state. 30 5 Furthermore, managed
care markets are constantly changing. 30 6 Thus, it seems likely that H.B.
3086 would result only in higher prices for patients, who would bear the
increase in physicians' costs without a guarantee of increased quality. 30 7
This outcome does not accomplish the goal of H.B. 3086, which is to
increase the quality of patient care throughout Illinois.30 8 Instead, H.B.
3086 simply provides physicians with a countervailing force to use in
negotiations in which they must prove to the Attorney General that an
MCO has a substantial market share. 309
C. Illinois House Bill 2115 is a Positive and Direct Solution to the
Problems in the Health Care Industry
H.B. 2115, the Fairness in Health Care Services Contracting Act, 310
stands in stark contrast to H.B. 3086 as a more appropriate and direct
form of managed care reform. 3 11 Instead of giving physicians a blanket
exemption from the federal antitrust laws, H.B. 2115 alleviates a
physician's contracting concerns by simplifying his contracts with
health care plans. 312  The legislation further endeavors to make
contracts that are unfair, misleading, or deceptive unlawful.3 13
Moreover, it protects physicians by not allowing a health care plan to
unilaterally decide when alteration or termination of a contract will
305. See Kopit, supra note 45, at 103 ("[Tlhere are a few markets where individual managed
care plans have monosony [sic] power."). "Monopsony power refers to a buyer's ability or power
to depress the price of a good or service below competitive levels." Segars, supra note 37, at
1322.
306. Kopit, supra note 45, at 103.
307. See Grimes, supra note 45, at 210.
308. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (stating that H.B. 3086 was designed to
ensure that health care plans and providers work together to provide quality health care to MCO
enrollees).
309. See generally Grimes, supra note 45, at 210-12. This condition is similar to when
successive oligopoly conditions are present. Id. In both situations, costs will be passed on to
buyers without the added quality. Id.
310. Fairness in Health Services Contracting Act, H.B. 2115, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(I1. 2001).
311. See Kopit, supra note 45, at 121.
312. I11. H.B. 2115, § 351E-5 (noting that H.B. 2115 calls for the simplification of contracts
between health care professionals and health care plans); see supra note 209 and accompanying
text.
313. Ill. H.B. 2115, § 351E-5; see supra note 210 and accompanying text (noting that H.B.
2115 intends to eliminate provisions contained in contracts that are unfair, misleading, or
unreasonably confusing in connection with services covered and reimbursement to health care
providers).
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occur.3 14  In short, H.B. 2115 addresses many of the problems
confronted by independent physicians and is a first step toward making
"take-it-or-leave-it" contracts in the health care industry a thing of the
past. 31
5
With a few slight modifications to H.B. 3086, Illinois could provide a
relatively unfettered antitrust exemption for physicians to collectively
bargain with health care plans while complying with the state action
doctrine at the same time.316  However, whether or not parties would
wish to collectively bargain under the terms of the bill remains to be
seen.317 H.B. 3086 is also too broad from a policy standpoint.318  First,
it is too rigid and complex for use in a rapidly changing industry.319
The bill also does nothing to constrain the knowledge gained by
physicians of their competitors' business. 320 Conversely, H.B. 2115 is a
more appropriate and direct version of managed care reform.321  Its
terms protect physicians from onerous "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts
and simplify the contracting process. 322 Clearly, the results under H.B.
2115 are more favorable than under H.B. 3086. As a result, the Illinois
General Assembly should pass H.B. 2115 and let H.B. 3086 languish
into oblivion.
V. PROPOSAL
Rather than pursuing the complex course of action outlined in H.B.
3086, Illinois should adopt less drastic solutions to deal with the current
problems plaguing the health care industry. As noted above, Illinois is
314. I11. H.B. 2115, § 351E-15. If a party to a contract can make changes unilaterally, then the
contract is essentially meaningless. See Illinois State Medical Society, Fairness in Contracting
Questions and Answers, at http://www.isms.org/legislative/fairness/qa.html (last modified Apr.
10, 2001).
315. See Illinois State Medical Society, Fairness in the Health Care Services Contracting Act,
at http://www.isms.org/legislative/faimess/summary.html (last modified Aug. 3, 2001).
316. See supra Part IV.A.2 (discussing how H.B. 3086 does not currently meet the active
supervision requirement of the Midcal test).
317. See supra Part IV.A.2 (examining how likely it is that competitors will risk increased
liability for participation in H.B. 3086).
318. See supra Part IV.B (analyzing how H.B. 3086 is too broad from a policy standpoint).
319. See supra Part IV.B.1 (examining how the FTC/DOJ Guidelines can be used to their
fullest potential to protect independent physicians and increase the quality of health care in the
industry).
320. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing countervailing power theory and its impact on the
health care industry).
321. See supra Part IV.C (discussing H.B. 2115 as a more direct version of managed care
reform).
322. See supra Part IV.C (discussing how H.B. 2115's terms protect physicians and simplify
their process of contracting).
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already working towards this goal by incorporating House Bill 2115
into Senate Joint Resolution 33, which calls for a joint task force to
investigate what the likely impact of H.B. 2115 will be to patients in
Illinois. 323  Alternatively, Illinois can decide not to pass any new
legislation and work within the status quo to regulate the potential
monopsony power of the MCOs when it actually arises. 324 Finally,
Illinois could pass legislation to displace competition only in specific
areas of the health care industry, where the link between regulation and
increased patient care does not involve a physician having to function
on behalf of his patients with the MCOs. 325  Indeed, these solutions
could achieve a better result than H.B. 3086 for health care consumers
in the state.
A. State and Federal Antitrust Agencies Must Become More Involved
The Sherman Act's prohibition on contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade applies equally to buyers and sellers.
326
Consequently, an aggressive approach, which attacks the monopsony
power of MCOs at the state and federal level, will result in a direct
benefit to consumers and reduce the need for physicians to have
countervailing power. Indeed, state and federal antitrust enforcement
agencies do not require new legislation to become more involved in the
antitrust scrutiny of MCOs. 327 Federal and state antitrust enforcement
over the monopsony power of MCOs has been lax in the past.
328
However, as the industry has grown, the federal court system has
stepped in to make public enforcement easier by modifying the test of
market share. Namely, federal courts have determined that an MCO
may have a substantial market share even though it consists of a small
323. See supra Part 11I.B (discussing the history of H.B. 2115).
324. See infra Part V.A (arguing that state and federal antitrust enforcement agencies should
scrutinize MCO mergers).
325. See infra Part V.B (proposing that Illinois adopt less broad solutions to remedy the
situation in the health care industry).
326. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see Segars, supra note 37, at 1323; see also supra
notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing how the Sherman Act blocks combinations
formed with the purpose or effect of restraining trade).
327. See Glassman, supra note 59, at 106-07. As the health care market matures, antitrust
enforcers could successfully challenge HMOs under the antitrust laws. Id. at 107.
328. See id. at 106-07 (noting that courts and regulators have viewed HMO markets as
transitional, allowing them to develop free from close antitrust scrutiny). Yet another potential
reason for this lack of close antitrust scrutiny is the fact that MCOs are often natural
monopsonies. See generally Segars, supra note 37, at 1323. Such natural monopsonies occur in
markets where a single purchaser creates efficiencies due to economies of scale. Id. As it is more
efficient for subscribers to purchase health care services jointly rather than individually, such
natural monopsonies exist free from antitrust scrutiny. Id.
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share of the market. 329  Under this new approach, federal and state
antitrust enforcement agencies are more likely to prevail when taking
legal action against a monopsonist who uses its power to acquire
nonprice advantages over a physician through "take-it-or-leave-it"
contracts. 330  Indeed, under the new test, these contracts may be
sufficient to subject MCOs to the antitrust laws. 331
In addition, as the MCO concept matures, federal and state antitrust
enforcement agencies must be on the lookout for mergers between
health care plans that would have a direct, negative effect on
consumers. 332  This oversight could be accomplished by promulgating
guidelines that specifically address the merger of MCOs or by
incorporating such a set into the existing FTC/DOJ Guidelines. 333
Likewise, federal and state agencies could carefully scrutinize and bring
enforcement actions against managed care plans that injure or threaten
to injure competition by creating monopsony power through MCO
consolidation. 334  Ultimately, this type of enforcement would have a
deterrent effect on future violators and would keep monopsonies to a
minimum in the marketplace. 335
B. Illinois Must Adopt Discrete Solutions to the Problematic Health
Care Situation
It is within Illinois' power under the state action doctrine to intervene
and displace competition in specific areas of the health care industry
where there is a direct link between state regulation and the increased
329. Glassman, supra note 59, at 129 (noting that emerging economic factors in the health
care financing market could lead courts to find that HMOs possess market power despite their
small share of the market); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing how courts
use market share as a proxy for market power).
330. See Segars, supra note 37, at 1325. Such provisions might even allow antitrust enforcers
to bring actions against natural monopsonies who contract with physicians. Id.
331. Id. (noting that contracts seeking to gain "exclusive access" to physician services may be
an antitrust violation under the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100
(1948)).
332. See id. at 1327-28 (noting that pre-merger scrutiny may provide adequate mechanisms
for regulation).
333. Id. at 1326. By specifically addressing the merger of MCOs, the agencies could
adequately prevent future monopsonies. Id.
334. Robert Pitofsky, Thoughts on Leveling the Playing Field In Health Care Markets, address
before the National Health Lawyers Association (Feb. 13, 1997), at http://www.ftc.gov/speechesl
pitofsky/nhla.htm (noting that as agencies review consolidations of managed care plans, they
consider whether the transaction is likely to injure competition through the creation of buyer
power).
335. See Segars, supra note 37, at 1328. "An agency enforcement policy implementing these
provisions could correct any existing market distortions and deter potential abuses of monopsony
power." Id.
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quality of patient care. 336 This type of regulation affects only a portion
of the industry and will certainly be more manageable to a state agency
charged with active supervision of the program.
As described previously, Oregon successfully displaced competition
in specific areas of the health care industry. 337  Moreover, in its
testimony to the House Judiciary Committee, the FTC highlighted
several proposals introduced at the state and federal levels that require
MCOs to present consumers with "comparative quality and
performance information" to help their decision-making. 338 Legislation
such as Oregon's and the potential proposals highlighted by the FTC
provide a direct link between regulation and the resultant benefit to
consumers. 339 These regulations and proposals are exemplary responses
to the demands of the public that will use these services to increase the
quality of care in the industry.
Similarly, the FTC has called for regulations that would offer
consumers a choice of health care coverage. 340  Because most
consumers obtain health care coverage through their employers,
341
Illinois could make it easier for small employers to participate in
purchasing pools, thus offering individuals a choice of health plans.342
This type of regulation would have a direct effect on the quality of
336. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 442.700-442.760 (2000 & Supp. 2001) (defining a state
regulation under the state action doctrine that only affects the transplant market); see also supra
note 169 and accompanying text (discussing a Washington statute that displaced competition in
situations where the physician faced disincentives in competing with MCOs).
337. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 442.700-442.760; see supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the Oregon
legislature's success in eliminating waste and duplication in the heart and kidney transplant
market).
338. H.R. REP. No. 106-625, at 41 (2000) (statement of Chairman Pitofsky) (noting that the
proposals present "comprehensive comparative quality and performance information ... to better
inform [an individual consumer' s] decision-making").
339. Id. at 40-41. An increase in consumer information is certainly a resultant benefit to
consumers. Id. at 41; see also OR. REV. STAT. §§ 442.700-442.760. Displacing competition in
the health care market for heart and kidney transplants to cut duplication and waste is also of
direct benefit to consumers. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 442.700-442.760; see also supra note 172 and
accompanying text (discussing Oregon's exemption).
340. H.R. REP. NO. 106-625, at 40-41. "Offering consumers a choice can help make health
plans more responsive to consumer preferences." Id. at 41.
341. Id. at 40.
342. Id.
Consumers have different views about many aspects of health care service delivery,
including the types of settings in which they want to receive health care, the kinds of
services and health practitioners to which they want access, how much they are willing
to pay for health insurance, and the value they attach to broader choices among
providers.
Id. at 40-41.
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health care for consumers and would increase the autonomy of
physicians over their practices. 343
As these examples illustrate, Illinois' joint negotiation legislation is
not necessary to achieve parity among physicians and health plans.
Instead, there are more manageable solutions, which already exist and
adequately deal with the current problems plaguing the health care
industry. These solutions include passing a version of Illinois House
Bill 2115, bringing enforcement actions against MCOs that truly have
monopsony power over the health care industry, and narrowly tailoring
state action immunities from the antitrust laws to areas where they are
needed most. The best result for health care consumers in Illinois is one
in which the state provides for direct increases in the quality of care to
consumers and does not assume that physicians with countervailing
power will act in the best interests of their patients.
VI. CONCLUSION
Illinois' Health Care Services Contract Joint Discussions Act, House
Bill 3086, should not become law in the state. H.B. 3086 does not
comply with the requirements of the state action doctrine. Moreover,
physicians frustrated by the impact of recent changes to their autonomy
and income levels, should realize that lobbying for a broad exemption to
the federal antitrust laws will do their patients more harm than good.
Instead, physicians should concentrate their efforts on working within
the confines of the current FTC/DOJ Guidelines. They should seek
relief from the so-called "take-it-or-leave-it" contracts by joining
properly structured physician network joint ventures, which require a
physician to accept a small reduction in autonomy. In addition, they
should lobby the federal and state legislatures and other state agencies
to increase enforcement of antitrust laws against MCOs, which have
true monopsonistic power. Finally, physicians can endorse legislation
that would have a direct impact on the quality of care for their patients.
Ultimately, the health care industry is dynamic and flexible. The rules
that govern the industry should reflect its nature and be dynamic and
flexible as well.
343. Id. at 41. "Increased consumer choice among health plans also would be good for
doctors." Id. Because patients can choose among doctors, physicians will not be required to
contract with multiple MCOs to keep their existing patient base. See id; see also supra note 47
and accompanying text (discussing how the current situation in the health care market required
physicians to turn away established and new patients because they were insured by an MCO).
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